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

WORLD JEWISH POPULATION 2020

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World Jewish Population, 2020

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The American Jewish Year Book 2020

The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities Since 1899

This Report derives from Chapter 8 of the *American Jewish Year Book, 2020*.

Since 1899, the *American Jewish Year Book* has documented the current status of North American Jewry: its demography, its institutions, and its accomplishments. It is the premier place for leading academics to publish in-depth review chapters on topics of interest to the North American Jewish communities. Cyrus Adler, Milton Himmelfarb, Henrietta Szold, and other prominent American Jews are among its former editors. In 2008, the *Year Book*, which had been published by the American Jewish Committee, ceased publication, a casualty of the 2008 economic recession.

From 2012 to the present, the *Year Book* has been published by Springer, a major worldwide scientific publisher. The editors of the *Year Book* are Arnold Dashefsky of the University of Connecticut and Ira Sheskin of the University of Miami, both accomplished social scientists of American Jewry. The *Year Book* is published in cooperation with the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry and the Berman Jewish Data Bank. Current funding comes from the University of Miami and the University of Connecticut.

The *Year Book* consists of lengthy review chapters on topics of general interest, chapters reviewing important events in the North American Jewish communities, chapters on the US, Canadian, and world Jewish population, lists of Jewish organizations (both local and national), Jewish scholarly resources, major events in the Jewish community, Jewish honorees, and obituaries of notable Jewish individuals. This volume has been a significant and prestigious annual resource for academic researchers, practitioners at Jewish institutions and organizations, the media, and others for basic, up-to-date information about the North American Jewish communities.

Almost all books on the history of North American Jewry cite the *Year Book.* The *Year Book* helps to preserve the current record for future generations.

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World Jewish Population, 2020

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Map 1 Countries Where 99% of World's Jewish Population Live, 2020



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WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2019

Sergio DellaPergola

At the beginning of 2020, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 14,787,200—an increase of 92,400 (0.63%) over the 2019 revised estimate of 14,694,800. The world's total population increased by 0.92% in 2019. The rate of increase of world Jewry hence amounted to two thirds of that of the total population. The Jewish population was highly concentrated in two countries: Israel (46% of the world total) and the US (39%). Nine percent lived in Europe, 5% in other North America and Latin America, and 1% in other continents. Steady demographic increase in Israel was matched by stagnation or decline elsewhere, explained by low birth rates, frequent intermarriage, identificational drift, aging, and emigration. Most Jews are increasingly found in a handful of developed and democratic countries, with tens of communities currently below sufficient critical mass needed to sustain viable community institutions. This report carefully reviews different approaches to Jewish population definitions and the highly variable availability and reliability of data sources. The critically important Jewish-Arab population balance in Israel and Palestine is analyzed. Estimates are provided for 102 countries with at least 100 Jews each, along with vignettes on the 14 largest Jewish populations each with 40,000 Jews or more—Israel, the US, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Russia, Germany, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, Hungary, Ukraine, and Mexico.

7.1 Assessing Jewish Population

On January 1, 2020, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 14,787,200—an increase of 92,400 (0.63%) over the 2019 revised estimate of 14,694,800 (DellaPergola 2020a). The world's total population increased by 0.92% in 2019 (Population Reference Bureau 2020). The rate of increase of world Jewry hence amounted to 68% of that of the total population.

Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in the rest of the world (the *Diaspora*)—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2020. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core* Jewish population concept addresses a human collective whose identification is mutually exclusive with respect to other subpopulations (see below). While this is the main definition of who is a Jew followed in this study, it should be stressed that the number of persons who carry multiple cultural and religious identities tends to increase in contemporary societies (Josselson and Harway 2012). Thirteen years were needed to add one million Jews from 11 to 12 million after the tragic human losses of World War II and the *Shoah* (Holocaust) (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 2000), and 40 more years were needed to add another million from 12 to 13 million. From the 1970s onwards, world Jewry stagnated at nearly *zero population growth* for nearly 20 years, but some demographic upturn occurred since 2000, mostly reflecting population increase in Israel. It took about 14 years to add another million from 13 to 14 million, and an increase of nearly 800,000 has occurred over the past eight years. In historical perspective and

based on similar definitions, world Jewish population has not yet recovered its size on the eve of World War II—16.5 million—and it may take decades more to do so.



Figure 1 World total population and core Jewish population, 1945-2020

World Jewish population size reflects a combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the rest of the world—the Jewish Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 and 630,000 in 1948 to nearly 6.8 million in 2020. The Jewish population of the Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable in number until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing, reaching just over 8.0 million in 2020. The world's total population increased more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.691 billion by mid-2019. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.92 per 1,000 currently—or one per every 521 inhabitants in the world.

Two countries, Israel and the US, accounted for over 84% of the 2020 total; 23 countries, each with 10,000 Jews or more, accounted for another 15%, and another 77 countries, each with Jewish populations below 10,000, accounted for the remaining 1%. **Figure 2** shows the size of the 20 largest *core* Jewish populations in 2020.



Fig. 7.2 Twenty largest core Jewish populations, 2020

Map 1 shows the geographical distribution of the 20 largest Jewish communities worldwide.

Israel's Jewish population reached 6,773,400 in 2020, *not* including 448,000 persons not recorded as Jews in the Ministry of Interior's Population Register but who are members of families initially admitted under the *Law of Return*—out of Israel's total legal population of 9,139,300 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics monthly). This corresponded to 45.8% of world Jewry by the *core* definition and represented a Jewish population increase of 109,100 (1.64%) in 2019. In the same year, the total Jewish population of the Diaspora was estimated to have decreased by 17,000 from 8,030,500 to 8,013,500 (-0.21%). For the US, based on the 2013 study *A Portrait of Jewish Americans* (Pew Research Center 2013), the *core* Jewish population was assessed at 5,700,000 constituting 38.5% of world Jewry in 2019. Core Jews in the US were assessed to have increased moderately since the year 2000, following several years of stagnation after probably reaching a peak around 1980 (DellaPergola 2013a). We deem the US Jewish population to have grown somewhat since 2013 but we chose not to update the extant estimate until release of the data from a new Pew survey undertaken in 2020. Jews in the rest of the world—outside Israel and the US—were assessed at 2,313,500 in 2020 (15.6%

of world Jewry). Since all of the decline of 16,700 among Diaspora Jews occurred in countries other than the US, that amounted to an annual loss of -0.72% in the aggregate for those countries. Among the total world population, growth in 2019 was 1.4% in less developed countries versus zero in the more developed countries where most Jews live.

Core Jewish Population



Map 1 Countries where 99% of the world's Jewish population live.

Please see page 8 of this document for a larger version of this map.

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel hosts the largest *core* Jewish community worldwide.

Some dissenting opinions (Saxe and Tighe 2013, SSRI 2019a, Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume) are mostly based on different definitions of the target population. Since Israel's independence in 1948, demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in Israel, their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, slow, and diverse changes reflecting births and deaths, geographical mobility, and the choice of millions of persons to express or to deny a Jewish collective identification not subordinated to nor on par with other explicit religious or ethnic identifications. At the same time, Jewish majority status in the state of Israel faces a significant demographic challenge vis-á-vis the more rapidly growing Palestinian Arab population within the boundaries of the State of Israel as well as in the West Bank and Gaza.

The fundamental demographic equation holds that population size at a given time reflects an uninterrupted chain of events that may change the size of that population from an earlier to a later date. Of the three possible determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths) where low Jewish birth rates and an increasingly elderly population generate higher death rates

and an overall deficit; and (b) the variable balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). The third determinant consists of identification changes (accessions and secessions)—in this case *passages* to and from a Jewish identity—and applies to subpopulations defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific characteristic, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group.

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility and a relatively young age distribution. These two drivers of demographic growth do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, including the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example Canada and Australia and, until recently, the US and Germany), and possibly some growth due to local natural increase (plausibly in the UK and Mexico, and minimally in Austria and Australia) the total number of Jews in Diaspora countries tends to diminish at varying rates.

All this holds true regarding the *core* Jewish population, which does *not* include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews with family connections to Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters (see further discussion below). The detailed mechanisms and supporting evidence of Jewish population change have been discussed extensively in previous issues of the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and will not be repeated here (see DellaPergola 2015a; for a detailed report on Jews in Europe see DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020).

Jewish population size and composition reflect the day-by-day interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola et al. 2005; DellaPergola 2017a; DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020).

The 2020 Jewish population data were updated from 2019 and previous years in accordance with known or estimated vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. The world and regional Jewish population estimates result from the sum of national estimates. While individual country estimates can be obtained from nationwide sources and sometimes also from the sum of local sources, in the case of the world's total, in the lack of a global population census, there is no alternative to the summation of country figures. In each of the country update procedures, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another in a particular country, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective over the years of our monitoring of world Jewish population. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be quite on target. Where needed, previous estimates were adjusted retrospectively based upon newer, better evidence.

The research findings reported here, perhaps more importantly, tend to confirm a coherent and conceptually robust and articulated interpretation of the trends prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011a). While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2020 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes involving bi-local residences and leading to double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study, special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally and nationally mobile and bi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one religious, ethnic, or cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to the other. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities; hence, Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage, but analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

7.1.1 Definitions

Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact the numbers. A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by several individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population as well as data quality, is addressed at all. This problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework for Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes, it would *not* be acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country, although in the daily conduct of Jewish community affairs such differences do prevail across countries.

In such an open, fluid, and somewhat undetermined environment, the very feasibility of undertaking a valid and meaningful study of the Jewish collective—let alone by the use of quantitative tools—generates debates between different intellectual stances facing Jewish population studies (DellaPergola 2014d). In particular, the study of a Jewish population (or of any other subpopulation) requires addressing three main problems:

1) *Defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;

2) *Identifying* the target group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting those who belong to it from all others. This is primarily achieved by systematic canvassing of populations and directly ascertaining personal identifications. Identification is also often performed through membership lists, distinctive Jewish names, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and

3) *Covering* the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews, by telephone, by mail, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on *operational* social scientific, not *prescriptive* rabbinical or legal, definitional criteria. The main conceptual aspects, besides being rooted in social theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility—not the least, available research budgets. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as response rates and cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social surveys (Keeter et al. 2017), the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. New field work strategies must be devised all the time so to avoid deterioration in the number and quality of final responses. Response rates for Jewish surveys tend to be better than for general surveys, and Jews are possibly readier than others to respond to surveys generally, but the quality of the data constitutes a topic of growing concern in contemporary social research.

No method exists to counter decreases in response rates and cooperation rates. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible to uncover, namely the degree of involvement with or indifference to feeling Jewish by respondents. Something that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be indirectly estimated through various imperfect techniques. However, there exist unsurmountable limits to what research methodologies can deliver. For example, large representative samples and small qualitative studies are not interchangeable regarding the answers they can provide to specific research questions. Research methods should be finely tuned to research goals. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of beliefs, hopes and fears, myths, and corporate interests. No perfect methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these biases—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction and non-advocacy studies such as this.

Keeping these limits in mind, four major definitional concepts will be considered here to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography worldwide (**Figure 3**):

(a) the **core Jewish population (CJP)**—the group who consider Judaism their mutually exclusive identification framework, including both those who do see and those who do not see religion as a major avenue for identification (In Figure 3: *Circle 1:* Jewish only, religion; *Circle 2*; Jewish only, no religion);

(b) the **population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)**—including those who say they are partly Jewish because their identity is split between two or more different and relevant identification frameworks (*Circle 3*), and those who say they are not Jewish but have at least one Jewish parent (*Circle 4*). Taken together Circles 3 and 4 may also be referred to as the “Jewish-connected” population;

(c) the **enlarged Jewish population (EJP)**—including those who say they have Jewish background but not a Jewish parent (*Circle 5*), and all non-Jewish household members who live in households with Jews (*Circle 6*); and

(d) the **Law of Return population (LRP)** (*Circle 7*). More detail on these definitions is presented in the **Appendix Table**.

All Jewish population data presented here refer to the total population in a given geographical unit, *not* the affiliated only or those who are religiously observant.



Figure 3 Configuring and defining contemporary Jewish populations, 2020

1-2 = Core Jewish population (CJP)
1 to 4 = Population with Jewish parent(s) (PJP)
1 to 6 = Enlarged Jewish population (EJP)
1 to 7 = Law of Return population (LRP)
Areas represented are not proportional to actual population sizes

This typology is relevant because not only it does mark-off alternative population definition approaches, but it also delineates different analytic paths grounded on alternative social theories as well as different possible Jewish institutional strategies in designating the respective catchment constituencies. It is important to realize that the categories in **Figure 3** are not static but continuous passages occur across the different circles, from center to periphery and vice-versa, and from the whole configuration outside, and into it. Further definitional extensions (not shown in **Figure 3**) may address those additional non-Jewish persons who feel some degree of **affinity with Judaism**, sometimes because their more distant ancestors were Jewish or because of other personal cultural or social connections with Jews. These forms of affinity arise growing interest in recent years in different regional contexts like Latin America (Torres 2017), Africa (Miles 2019), or the Western countries (Vincze 2020) in the light of attempts by groups to set up organized communities who claim pertinence to Judaism and ask to be recognized as such by various rabbinical or institutional authorities.

Partly in connection, but also beyond these issues, some studies may have reached people whose **ancestors *ever* were Jewish** regardless of the respondents' present identification. Socio-demographic surveys indeed sometimes ask about the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some population surveys *do* ask about more distant ancestry. Historians may wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are descendants of those Jews—for example, *Conversos* who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages, or the descendants of Jews who lived during the Roman Empire, or the Lost Tribes (Parfitt 2002; Parfitt and Fisher 2016; Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018; Gross et al. 2019). The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010; Carmi et al. 2014, Tian et al. 2015). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.

The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers and by Jewish organizations tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on population estimates beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core Jew population* definition. These decisions may reflect local needs and sensitivities but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here. The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, country, and major metropolitan area, are consistently anchored to the concept of *core* Jewish population. The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any broader definition such as the population with Jewish parents, the *enlarged* definition, or the *Law of Return* definition (see detail in the **Appendix Table**).

7.1.2 Data Sources

The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research on current population estimates have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including access to unpublished databases. It should be emphasized, however, that the

elaboration of worldwide estimates of the number of Jews in the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband et al. 1988; DellaPergola 2014c, 2014d). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, data users should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of Jewish population estimates.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. These data consist of national population censuses, national population registers, national and international public and private sponsored surveys, and national or Jewish community records of vital statistics, migration, and conversions. Some of this ongoing data compilation is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Avraham Harman Research Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Jewish population projections undertaken by the author in light of the latest data, also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data. Other existing estimates of total world Jewish population and of its geographical distribution (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012; Johnson and Zurlo 2014; Pew Research Center 2015a) provide findings quite close to ours. Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew comparisons often rely on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. As Jews are usually an extremely small fraction of the total, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affected by large sampling errors. A full list of the types and quality of documentation upon which Jewish population estimates are based is reported in the **Appendix Table** below.

7.2 World Jewish Population Size and Distribution by Major Areas

As noted, in our current estimates, we corrected previously published Jewish population data in light of new information. In recent years, the most significant correction was an addition of about 300,000 Jews in the US following the 2013 Pew study. This revision generated retrospective revisions of the whole annual series of data for the US, for the total Diaspora, and for World Jewry since 2000. **Table 1** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945 through 2019, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book* and retroactively corrected as now, also adjusting all revisions that had been suggested in previous years. These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published by other authors until 1980 and since 1981, by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* in the past based on the information that was available on each date. It is possible that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

Table 1 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2020

	World Jewish Population			World Population		Jews per
Year	Original estimate[a]	Revised estimate[b]	Annual % change[c]	Total (millions)[d]	Annual % change	1000 total population
1945, May 1	11,000,000	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,303,400	11,297,000	0.57	2,526	1.76	4.47
1960, Jan. 1	12,792,800	12,079,000	0.67	3,026	1.82	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	13,950,900	12,585,000	0.41	3,691	2.01	3.41
1980, Jan. 1	14,527,100	12,819,000	0.18	4,449	1.81	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,810,300	12,868,000	0.04	5,321	1.74	2.42
2000, Jan. 1	13,191,500	13,150,000	0.22	6,127	1.42	2.15
2005, Jan. 1	13,034,100	13,460,000	0.47	6,514	1.23	2.07
2010, Jan. 1	13,428,300	13,854,000	0.58	6,916	1.20	2.00
2015, Jan. 1	14,310,500	14,311,600	0.64	7,236	0.91	1.98
2016, Jan. 1	14,410,700	14,407,600	0.67	7,336	1.38	1.96
2017, Jan. 1	14,511,100	14,507,600	0.69	7,436	1.14	1.95
2018, Jan. 1	14,606,000	14,606,500	0.65	7,536	1.13	1.94
2019, Jan. 1	14,707,400	14,694,500	0.60	7,621	1.11	1.93
2020, Jan. 1	14,787,200		0.63	7,691	0.92	1.92

a As published in the *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some estimates reported here as of Jan. 1 were originally published as of Dec. 31 of the previous year
b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
c Based on revised estimates, except latest year
d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations Population Division (2018), Population Reference Bureau (2020)

The time series in **Table 1** clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally between the 1960s and the 1990s. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 282,000 in the 1990s. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 704,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2020, world Jewry increased by 933,000, but Israel's Jewish population increased by 1,069,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish population decreased by 136,000. **Table 1** also demonstrates the slower world Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of the world population. In 2020, the share of Jews among the world population (1.92 per 1,000) was 40.4% of the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

Table 2 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population by major geographical regions at the beginning of 2020 as compared to 2019. The originally published estimates from the 2019 *American Jewish Year Book* were slightly revised reflecting retroactive corrections due to improved information. These corrections resulted in a net decrease of 12,600 persons in the 2019 world Jewry estimate, reflecting a subtraction of 14,200 from the previous estimate for South Africa, 4,100 for the rest of Diaspora countries, and 1,300 for Israel, and a net increase of 5,000 in the rest of the Jewish Diaspora.

Table 2 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2019 and 2020[a]

Region	2019 Revised[b] Estimate	2019 Revised[b] Percent[c]	2020 Estimate	2020 Percent[c]	Percentage change 2019-2020	Jews per 1000 total population In 2020
World total	**14,694,800**	**100.0**	**14,787,200**	**100.0**	**0.63**	**1.92**
Diaspora	8,030,500	54.6	8,013,800	54.2	-0.21	1.04
US	5,700,000	38.8	5,700,000	38.5	0.00	17.32
Other	2,330,500	15.9	2,313,800	15.6	-0.71	0.31
Israel[d]	6,664,300	45.4	6,773,400	45.8	1.64	741.13
America, total	**6,468,200**	**44.0**	**6,466,900**	**43.7**	**-0.02**	**6.40**
North[e]	6,092,100	41.5	6,093,100	41.2	0.02	16.62
Central, Caribbean	57,300	0.4	57,400	0.4	0.17	0.26
South	318,800	2.2	316,400	2.1	-0.75	0.74
Europe, total	**1,343,300**	**9.1**	**1,329,400**	**9.0**	**-1.03**	**1.60**
European Union[f]	791,100	5.4	788,800	5.3	-0.29	1.77
FSU[g]	221,900	1.5	210,400	1.4	-5.18	1.04
Other West, Balkans[h]	330,300	2.2	330,200	2.2	-0.03	1.81
Asia, total	**6,699,900**	**45.6**	**6,808,500**	**46.0**	**1.62**	**1.51**
Israel	6,664,300	45.4	6,773,400	45.8	1.64	741.13
FSU	15,300	0.1	14,800	0.1	-3.27	0.16
Other	20,300	0.1	20,300	0.1	0.50	0.00
Africa, total	**57,800**	**0.4**	**56,800**	**0.4**	**-1.73**	**0.04**
Northern[i]	3,300	0.0	3,300	0.0	0.00	0.01
Sub-Saharan[j]	54,500	0.4	53,500	0.4	-1.83	0.06
Oceania[k]	**125,600**	**0.9**	**125,600**	**0.8**	**0.00**	**2.96**

a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2019. Source: United Nations (2019), Population Reference Bureau (2020)
b Compare with the original in DellaPergola (2020). The corrections reflecting newly available data are for South Africa (-14,200), Israel (-1,300),
Chile (-2,000), Russia (-2,000), Bahamas (-100), Portugal (+2,500), Spain (+1,300), Iran (+1,200), Monaco (+700), Jamaica (+300),
United Arab Emirates (+300), Austria (+200), Channel Islands (+200), Cyprus (+200), Barbados (+100)
c Minor discrepancies due to rounding
d Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
e US and Canada
f EU Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Not including the UK
g FSU excluding the Baltic countries. Asian parts of Russia included in Europe
h Including the UK. Asian parts of Turkey included in Europe
i Including Ethiopia
j Including South Africa and Zimbabwe
k Including Australia and New Zealand

Looking first at global trends, the number of Jews in Israel increased from the revised 6,664,300 in 2019 to 6,773,400 at the beginning of 2020, an increase of 109,100, or 1.64%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora *decreased* from the revised 8,030,500 to 8,013,800—a decrease of 16,700, or -0.21%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU), and to a lesser extent from France, South Africa, the small remnants of Jewish communities in Moslem

countries, and other countries, and the internal decrease due to an excess of deaths over births typical of the majority of Diaspora Jewry. In Israel, of the total increase of 109,100 core Jews, 94,700 derived from the balance of births (133,277) and deaths (38,581), 15,200 reflected the Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration), while the balance of conversions to and from Judaism recorded a net loss of -800 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual). Israel's net migration balance of 15,200 resulted from 18,800 new immigrants and tourists who changed their status to immigrants, and a net loss of -3,600 in the balance of returning Israelis, Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time, and Israeli residents who left the country and had not returned after one year of permanence abroad. Therefore, in 2019 internal demographic change produced 86.8% of the total Jewish population growth in Israel. According to these estimates the Jewish Diaspora's estimated decrease of 16,700 was largely explained by an aggregate negative migration balance versus Israel (-15,200). This would leave room for a decrease of only 1,500 due to other causes, which quite certainly underestimates the actually negative vital balance in most countries. The result may be higher than real population estimates for the total of Diaspora Jewry, which might require future adjustments.

Recently, for sure, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from the FSU, Ethiopia, some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this same phenomenon of return or first-time accession to Judaism occurs throughout Diaspora communities as well. The addition of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to a minimal fraction of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel (Fisher 2015, 2019; DellaPergola 2017c; Nissim 2018).

In descending order by continents, 46% of world Jewry in 2020 lived in **Asia**, overwhelmingly in Israel (whose initial estimate was downwardly revised, as noted, by 1,300) (**Table 2** and **Appendix Table**). Asia is defined herein to include the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asiatic areas of the Russian Federation and Turkey. The Jewish presence in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel which accounts for more than 99% of the continental total. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia account each for less than one-half of one percent of the total. Clearly, the fast economic development in Southeast Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and especially China, is attracting Jewish professionals, businesspeople, and technicians. The numbers are still small but are growing. A new entry this year is the United Arab Emirates with an estimated permanent Jewish population of 300. Following the 2016 national census, the figure for Iran was raised (+1,200).

About 44% of the world's Jews resided in **the Americas**, with 41.2% in North America. The Jewish population in the Americas, estimated at 6,466,900 in 2020, is predominantly concentrated in the US (5,700,000, or 88% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (393,000, 6%), South America (316,400, 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (57,400, 1%). Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in South America, reflecting emigration motivated by recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). Central American countries such as Mexico and Panama were the exceptions and absorbed

Jewish migrants from other countries in Latin America. In the Miami Jewish community alone, the number of members of households containing a Jewish adult from Latin American countries increased from roughly 18,000 in 2004 to 24,500 in 2014 (Sheskin 2015b). In neighboring Broward County, the same measure increased from 5,300 in 1997 to 26,500 in 2016 (Sheskin 2017). Between 2001 and 2019 the total number of immigrants from Latin America to Israel surpassed 25,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics), including many persons highly educated and highly involved in Jewish life (Bokser Liwerant et al. 2015). Outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism has appeared among real or putative descendants of *Conversos* whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal in the 15th and 16th centuries. Some of these *Converso* communities have been trying to create permanent frameworks to express their Jewish identity, in part locally, in part through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especially in smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries (Israel Ministry of Diaspora Affairs 2018). Persons with such backgrounds are also migrating to Israel (Torres 2017). In the light of new evidence, corrections were introduced for Jamaica (+300), Barbados (+100), Bahamas (-100), and Chile (-2,000).

Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounted for 9% of world Jewry (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020). The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,329,400 in 2020, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU). The EU, comprising 27 countries after the secession of the UK (still not fully implemented), had an estimated total of 788,800 Jews in 2020 (59% of the continent's total). The momentous political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the territorial deployment of Jewish communities in Europe. Revitalization of Jewish community life in the western countries had occurred over the past decades through immigration mainly from North Africa and the Middle East and also from the FSU. But more recently, economic recession and rising perceptions of antisemitism across the continent have brought about growing Jewish dissatisfaction and emigration (DellaPergola 2017b; Staetsky 2017; Staetsky et al. 2013; European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013, 2018). Total emigration from the EU to Israel rose from 13,635 in 2005-2009 to 19,134 in 2010-2014, and 23,098 in 2015-2019. In spite of the unifying project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted to create such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013; Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019a, 2020). The EU's initially expanding format symbolized an important historical landmark and a promising framework for the development of Jewish life. However, in recent years, the EU concept and ideal finds itself under major stress, and the UK Brexit is only one of its symptoms. Disagreements about migration policies facing large Muslim population increases in different European locales reflect the unsolved dilemma of defining Europe's own cultural identity and geopolitical boundaries. Other European countries not part of the EU or the FSU, including (from 2020) the UK and Turkey, comprised 330,200 core Jews (25% of the European total, of which 22% are

in the UK). We revised the Jewish population estimates for four EU countries: Portugal (+2,500), Spain (+1,300), Austria (+200), and Cyprus (+200). Two new entries appear this year, the Channel Islands (200) and the Principality of Monaco (700). These areas were previously included in the estimates of the UK and France, respectively.

The four former Soviet republics in Europe (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, excluding the three Baltic republics) had a Jewish population of 210,400 (16% of the continental total). The FSU is the area where, in absolute numbers, Jewish population has diminished the most since 1991 (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015; Konstantinov 2007). Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting emigration, an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high intermarriage rates, and low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease is being alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural, and religious activities supported by American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman 2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with 14,471 in 2016, 16,122 in 2017, 18,887 in 2018, and 24,146 in 2019 out of a total of 33,096 new immigrants (73%). Our 2020 assessment of the total *core* Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics in Europe and Asia was 248,100, of whom 219,200 in Europe (including 8,800 in the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 14,800 in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members created an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly three times as large as the *core* (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011, 2015). The estimate for Russia was downwardly revised (-2,000).

Little more than 1% of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania combined. The Jewish population in **Africa** is mostly concentrated in South Africa whose estimated Jewish population constituted about 94% of the continental total but underwent a significant downward reduction (-14,200) in the light of a new survey conducted in 2019 (Graham 2020). Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in **Oceania** where Australia accounts for 94% of the total.

Overall, in 2019 Jewish population size increased primarily in Israel and to a modest extent in North America, Central America and Oceania, and decreased to varying degrees in South America, the European Union, other Western Europe and the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa.

7.2.1 Implications of alternative Jewish population definitions

In **Table 3**, we evaluate the Jewish population's world and regional distribution according to several alternative definitions, as also outlined in **Figure 3**. Updated and revised *core* Jewish population estimates (CJP in the table) are presented, along with the total of those who *have Jewish parents* regardless of their current identity (PJP); the *enlarged Jewish population* inclusive of non-Jewish household members (EJP); and the population eligible for the *Law of Return* (LRP). Detailed country estimates are reported in the **Appendix Table**. The main purpose of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate comparisons across countries. In light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it is clear that Jewish investigators and/or community leaders in different countries sometimes follow local definitional criteria that may differ from the criteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US or Canada is evaluated quite differently in this report

than in the reports on the US and Canadian Jewish populations available at www.jewishdatabank.org. In other words, criteria that may be understood or even preferred in one country may not be meaningful or acceptable in another country. But in a global study like this, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently for all countries. The prime choice unavoidably must fall on a minimum common denominator. However, by showing the implications of different definitions for Jewish population evaluation, we offer readers an additional tool to better appreciate ongoing population trends in their countries.

Starting from the core Jewish population estimate of 14,787,200 (CJP) in 2020, if we add persons who state they are partly Jewish and non-Jews who have Jewish parents, a broader global aggregate population estimate of 18,030,900 (PJP) is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, an *enlarged* estimate obtains of 21,005,700 (EJP). Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and spouse provisions of Israel's *Law of Return*, the total Jewish and non-Jewish aliyah-eligible population can be roughly estimated at 23,809,100 (LRP). The US holds a significantly larger *Jewish parents population* (PJP) living in households with Jews or other persons with immediate Jewish background than Israel—roughly 8 million compared to 6,997,100, respectively.

Table 3 Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2020

Region	Core Jewish population[a] CJP	Population with Jewish parents[b] PJP	Enlarged Jewish population[c] EJP	Law of Return population[d] LRP	Difference LRP – CJP		Percent expansion LRP over CJP
					Number	Percent distribution	
World total	**14,787,200**	**18,030,900**	**21,005,700**	**23,809,100**	**9,021,900**	**100.0**	**61**
North America	6,093,100	8,450,200	10,550,300	12,700,400	6,607,300	73.3	108
Latin America	373,800	504,300	605,200	716,300	342,500	3.8	92
European Union[e]	788,800	1,010,500	1,267,800	1,505,700	716,900	7.9	91
FSU in Europe[e]	210,400	430,800	632,500	843,000	632,600	7.0	301
Rest of Europe[f]	330,200	378,000	425,000	472,100	141,900	1.6	43
Israel[g]	6,773,400	6,997,100	7,220,700	7,220,700	447,300	5.0	7
FSU in Asia	14,800	25,700	37,100	50,500	35,700	0.4	241
Rest of Asia	20,300	23,900	28,400	32,400	12,100	0.1	60
Africa	56,800	71,700	83,900	97,100	40,300	0.4	71
Oceania	125,600	138,700	154,800	170,900	45,300	0.5	36

a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity
b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent
c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.)
d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification
e The Former Soviet Union Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included in the European Union. UK not included.
f Includes the UK
g Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

The results, though tentative, provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of those who have a Jewish parent (PJP) (18,030,900), regardless of their own identification, stands 3,243,700 higher than the 14,787,200 core Jewish population. The total number of household members with at least one core Jew in the household (EJP) is estimated to comprise an additional increment of 2,974,800. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return (LRP) is roughly estimated at 23,809,100, an additional increment of 2,803,400. All in all, the difference between the Law of Return population (LRP) and the core Jewish population (CJP) is 9,021,900. Of these roughly estimated over 9 million partly Jewish, somewhat Jewish-connected, or otherwise included non-Jewish members of Jewish households, 73.3% live in North America, 7.9% in the EU, 7.4% in the FSU Republics in Europe and Asia, 5.0% in Israel, 3.8% in Latin America, 1.6% in other European countries, and 1% in the Rest of Asia, Africa and Oceania.

The relative impact of the various population definitions linking the *core* Jewish population (CJP) and the Law of Return population (LRP) is quite different in the three main geographical divisions considered in **Figure 4**. Since the impact of intermarriage is much lower in Israel than elsewhere, the extensions beyond the core in Israel are quite limited and primarily reflect immigration of intermarried households and, more recently, births in Israel from these households. In other communities outside the US and Israel, the graphic portrays the significant expansion of population aggregates around the CJP. One finally notes that with the emigration—mainly to Israel—of core Jews, the number of other people connected in some way to Judaism does not necessarily diminish across world Jewish communities. Their propensity to change country of residence may be actually lower than among core Jews, but they remain nonetheless as a more or less submerged and often invisible component of the global Jewish population configuration. On the other hand, with the passing of time, as more core Jews pass because of aging, and more of those directly although loosely related non-Jews pass too for the same reason, the more distant circles may eventually lose awareness of their linkage to the core collective.



Figure 4 Core and extended Jewish populations in the United States, Israel, and other countries, thousands, 2020

7.3 Jewish Population Distribution in Major Countries

7.3.1 Development and the Jewish presence

Reflecting moderate growth in global Jewish population accompanied by increasing concentration in a few countries, in 2020 84.4% of world Jews lived in Israel and the US, and 96.5% were concentrated in the ten countries with the most Jews. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determined the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends.

In 2020, 99% of world Jewry lived in the largest 25 Jewish communities, each evaluated at 10,000 or more. Excluding Israel, 98% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 24 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 71% in the US (**Table 4**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (Russia); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances *vis-á-vis* the Jewish presence.

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by the persistence of a higher share of Jews among the total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be directly related to the country's level of development (**Table 5**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2020, in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza) the share of Jews out of the total population was 741.1 per 1000. Israel's population high rate of Jewishness obviously reflects its special positioning in Jewish identity perceptions, but Israel also has become a developed country, and, as such, attractive to prospective migrants. In the US, the *core* Jewish population represented 17.3 per 1000 of total population; Jews comprised 3.6 per 1000 total population on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.7 per 1000 on average in the other 16 countries with 10,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority (80%) of world population.

To further illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, **Table 5** reports the latest available Human Development Index (HDI) for each country in 2018 (United Nations Development Programme 2019). The HDI—a composite measure of a society's level of education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics and proximate environments of the members of those Jewish communities. Of the 25 countries listed, five are included among the top ten HDIs among 189 countries ranked (Switzerland, Germany, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands). Another seven countries are ranked 11th to 25th (Canada, the US, the UK, Belgium, Austria, Israel, and

Spain), six more are between 26th and 50th (France, Italy, Chile, Hungary, Argentina, and Russia), six are between 51st and 100th (Uruguay, Turkey, Panama, Mexico, Brazil, and Ukraine), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (113th), pointing to lesser development in the host society. Remarkably, all of the 9 largest Jewish populations, amounting together to 96% of world Jewry, live in countries with HDIs among the top 50.

Table 4 25 Countries with core Jewish populations of 10,000 and more, 1/1/2020

Jewish population rank	Country	Core Jewish population	% of total Jewish Population			
			In the world		In the diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	Israel[a]	6,773,400	45.8	45.8	[b]	[b]
2	United States	5,700,000	38.5	84.4	71.1	71.1
3	France	448,000	3.0	87.4	5.6	76.7
4	Canada	393,000	2.7	90.0	4.9	81.6
5	United Kingdom	292,000	2.0	92.0	3.6	85.3
6	Argentina	179,500	1.2	93.2	2.2	87.5
7	Russia	155,000	1.0	94.3	1.9	89.4
8	Germany	118,000	0.8	95.1	1.5	90.9
9	Australia	118,000	0.8	95.9	1.5	92.4
10	Brazil	92,000	0.6	96.5	1.1	93.5
11	South Africa	52,300	0.4	96.8	0.7	94.2
12	Hungary	47,200	0.3	97.2	0.6	94.8
13	Ukraine	45,000	0.3	97.5	0.6	95.3
14	Mexico	40,000	0.3	97.7	0.5	95.8
15	Netherlands	29,800	0.2	97.9	0.4	96.2
16	Belgium	29,000	0.2	98.1	0.4	96.6
17	Italy	27,300	0.2	98.3	0.3	96.9
18	Switzerland	18,500	0.1	98.5	0.2	97.1
19	Uruguay	16,500	0.1	98.6	0.2	97.3
20	Chile	16,000	0.1	98.7	0.2	98.3
21	Sweden	15,000	0.1	98.8	0.2	97.7
22	Turkey	14,600	0.1	98.9	0.2	97.9
23	Spain	13,000	0.1	99.0	0.2	98.1
24	Austria	10,300	0.1	99.0	0.1	98.2
25	Panama	10,000	0.1	99.1	0.1	98.3

a Includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights
b Not applicable

Figure 5 demonstrates the relationship that prevails between Jewish population size and the respective countries' human development. The horizontal axis shows the average HDI ranks of world countries regrouped by Jewish population size (as in **Table 5**). The vertical axis indicates the total Jewish population of the same groups of countries. It appears that a country's level of development allows or stimulates conditions promoting more than proportionally the size of the local Jewish population. The statistical relationship between the HDI and the total number of Jews by type of countries is extraordinarily powerful, as indicated by an explained variance of 84% when including

Israel, and 88% when excluding Israel. The loss of explanatory power following Israel's inclusion means that the strong Jewish presence in Israel cannot be exclusively explained by the environmental circumstances of high development, and obviously draws on deeper historical, cultural, and religious determinants. But in the rest of the world (the Diaspora) the relationship between Human Development and Jewish presence certainly works. As a caveat, it is worth repeating that Jewish communities may display social and economic profiles significantly better than the average population of their respective countries. Nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of each individual, Jews included, everywhere. Changes in the quality of life of individual countries foreshadow changes in Jewish population distribution worldwide mostly through international migration. Of the two countries with the largest Jewish populations, Israel held its 2017 rank in 2018 (22th, one better that the average of the seven countries with 100,000 to 500,000 Jews). The US lost two positions (from 13th to 15th), likewise France (from 24th to 26th). Such and similar shifts in development ranking should be monitored carefully as they may critically affect world Jewish population distribution.

Table 5 25 largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 country's total population and Human Development Indices, 1/1/2020

Rank	Country	2020 Core Jewish population	2020 Total population	Jews per 1000 total population	2018 HDI rank[a]
1	**Israel[b]**	**6,773,400**	**9,139,300**	**741.1**	**22**
2	**United States**	**5,700,000**	**329,153,000**	**17.3**	**15**
3	France	448,000	64,834,000	6.9	26
4	Canada	393,000	37,413,000	10.5	13
5	United Kingdom	292,000	66,833,000	4.4	15
6	Argentina	179,500	44,939,000	4.0	48
7	Russia	155,000	146,731,000	1.1	49
8	Germany	118,000	83,100,000	1.4	4
9	Australia	118,000	25,305,000	4.7	6
	Other 100,000 and over	**1,703,500**	**469,155,000**	**3.6**	**23**
10	Brazil	92,000	209,332,000	0.4	79
11	South Africa	52,300	58,616,000	0.9	113
12	Hungary	47,200	9,770,000	4.8	43
13	Ukraine	45,000	42,037,000	1.1	88
14	Mexico	40,000	126,577,000	0.3	76
15	Netherlands	29,800	17,335,000	1.7	10
16	Belgium	29,000	11,458,000	2.5	17
17	Italy	27,300	60,345,000	0.5	29
18	Switzerland	18,500	8,572,000	2.2	2
19	Uruguay	16,500	3,519,000	4.7	57
20	Chile	16,000	19,107,000	0.8	42
21	Sweden	15,000	10,286,000	1.5	8
22	Turkey	14,600	82,607,000	0.2	59
23	Spain	13,000	47,073,000	0.3	25
24	Austria	10,300	8,877,000	1.2	20
25	Panama	10,000	4,219,000	2.4	67
	Other 10,000 and over	**476,500**	**719,730,000**	**0.7**	**46**
	Rest of the world[c]	**133,800**	**6,164,252,700**	**0.0**	**> 100**

a *HDI* The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education, and income (measured as US dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme (2019)
b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights**.** Total population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents and non-Jewish members of Jewish households of the West Bank
c Average HDI rank for group of countries



Figure 5 Major groups of countries by Human Development Index (HDI) and total core Jewish population, 2020

7.3.2 Time comparisons

The current Jewish population distribution worldwide has resulted from dramatic changes in the geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural profile of world Jewry – particularly since the independence of the state of Israel but also since the June 1967 war. As an illustration of the intervening changes, we report the world distribution of core Jewish population by major geographical regions in 1948, 1970, 2000, and 2020 (**Figure 6**).



Figure 6 Core Jewish populations by major regions, 1948, 1970, 2000, 2020, thousands

Two opposing trends emerge from this comparison covering more than 70 years: on the one hand, Israel's Jewish population increased from being a small entity in 1948 to being the prime component of world Jewish population by 2020; on the other hand, we see the decline, and in some cases the disappearance of the major Jewish population centers in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the FSU, and the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Declines of a lesser scale also appear in Latin America and Southern Africa. North America, and to a lesser extent Western Europe, maintained relatively stable Jewish population sizes, although in the latter case through a significant turnaround of periods of immigration and periods of emigration. As already noted, the tendency over time was much greater consolidation of world Jewry in the two major centers in the US (here together with Canada) and Israel, versus a much more equally dispersed Jewish population worldwide shortly after the end of World War II.

A more detailed picture of the changes intervening between 1970 and 2020 appears in **Table 6**. Here we compare the numbers and ranks for the 33 countries with a Jewish population of at least 20,000 Jews in 1970—based on revised estimates and using the detailed country list that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union (FSU), Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Striking changes occurred in size and global ranking of country Jewish populations during the 50 years between1970 and 2020. Six countries had a larger Jewish population in 2020 than half a century earlier. Quantitatively, the most remarkable was Israel's Jewish population more than doubling from 2,581,000 to 6,773,400 (+162.4%). The greatest percentage growth occurred in Germany (+293.3%). Absolute population increases were also recorded in Australia (+81.5%), Canada (+37.4%), Mexico (+14.3%), and the US (+3.4%). The other 27 countries witnessed Jewish population reduction, with eight countries losing more than 90% of their 1970 population (Ethiopia, Morocco, and the five former Soviet republics of Moldova, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). Six more countries lost 80% to 90% of their 1970 Jews: Iran, Romania, and the FSU republics of Lithuania, Latvia, Azerbaijan and Russia. An entirely different ranking of the major communities consequently emerged. The top 5 in 1970 were the US, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, and France; in 2019 they had become Israel, US, France, Canada, and the UK. Ethiopia lost 51 positions in the global ranking of Jewish populations, Georgia lost 33 and Moldova 32. Germany gained 19 rank positions, Switzerland 15, and the Netherlands 13. But, while the country ranked 33rd in 1970 (Switzerland) had 20,000 Jews, in 2020 India with the same rank had 4,800.

The geographical realignment of world Jewry reflects past sufferance from political discrimination and persecution and lack of democracy, as well as socioeconomic development lags and lack of economic opportunities in the countries that lost Jewish population. The consequent mass migration from those countries generated large Jewish population declines, mostly in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. On the other hand, countries that offered greater freedom and a wider range of socioeconomic opportunities witnessed steady Jewish population growth or at least stability (DellaPergola 2020b). This amounted at a huge westernization of world Jewry.

7.3.3 Dispersion and Concentration

In 2020, 102 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 7**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews (but less than 5,000,000), two had 50,000 to 99,999, six had 25,000 to 49,999, eight had 10,000 to 24,999, seven had 5,000 to 9,999, 28 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 42 had 100 to 999. The 77 communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for less than 1% of world Jewry.

In only five Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1000 (or 0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (22.9 Jews per 1000 inhabitants), Monaco (18.4), the US (17.3), Canada (10.5), and France (6.9). The case of Israel is very different, with a *core* Jewish population that represents 74.1% of the total legal population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 79.1% of the total population. In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population has been decreasing.

Table 6 Countries with at least 20,000 Jews in 1970, and core Jewish population in 2020

Country	1970	Rank	2020	Rank	% change	Rank diff.
United States	5,515,000	1	5,700,000	2	**3.4%**	-1
Israel	2,581,000	2	6,773,400	1	**162.4%**	+1
Russia	807,900	3	155,000	7	-80.8%	-4
Ukraine	777,100	4	45,000	13	-94.2%	-9
France	530,000	5	448,000	3	-15.5%	+2
United Kingdom	390,000	6	292,000	5	-25.1%	+1
Canada	286,000	7	393,000	4	**37.4%**	+3
Argentina	282,000	8	179,500	6	-36.3%	+2
Belarus	148,000	9	8,500	25	-94.3%	-16
South Africa	118,000	10	52,300	11	-55.7%	-1
Uzbekistan	102,900	11	2,900	37	-97.2%	-26
Moldova	98,100	12	1,900	44	-98.1%	-32
Brazil	90,000	13	92,000	10	2.2%	+3
Iran	72,000	14	9,500	28	-86.8%	-14
Hungary	70,000	15	47,200	12	-32.6%	+3
Romania	70,000	16	8,900	26	-87.3%	-10
Australia	65,000	17	118,000	9	**81.5%**	+8
Georgia	55,400	18	1,500	51	-97.3%	-33
Morocco	45,000	19	2,100	46	-95.3%	-27
Azerbaijan	41,300	20	7,200	29	-82.6%	-9
Turkey	39,000	21	14,600	22	-62.6%	-1
Latvia	36,700	22	4,500	45	-87.7%	-23
Mexico	35,000	23	40,000	14	**14.3%**	+9
Belgium	32,500	24	29,000	15	-10.8%	+9
Uruguay	32,000	25	16,500	17	-48.4%	+8
Italy	32,000	26	27,300	16	-14.7%	+10
Germany	30,000	27	118,000	8	**293.3%**	+19
Netherlands	30,000	28	29,800	15	-0.7%	+13
Chile	30,000	29	16,000	20	-46.7%	+9
Kazakhstan	27,700	30	2,500	43	-91.0%	-13
Ethiopia	25,000	31	100	82	-99.6%	**-51**
Lithuania	23,600	32	2,400	45	-89.8%	-13
Switzerland	20,000	33	18,500	18	-7.5%	+15

a Ranked as of 1970. In bold Jewish population that increased in absolute size. The following countries had Jewish populations among the 33 largest in 2020, but not in 1970: Sweden, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Panama, New Zealand, Venezuela, India

Table 7 World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion per 1,000 total population, 1/1/2020

Number of core Jews in country	Jews per 1000 total population					
	Total	Less than 1.0	1.0-4.9	5.0-9.9	10.0-19.9	20.0+
Number of countries						
Total[a]	102	72	24	1	4	1
100-999	42	36	4	-	2	-
1,000-4,999	28	26	2	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	7	5	2	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	8	2	6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	6	2	4	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	2	1	1	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	7	-	5	1	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)						
Total[b]	14,787,200	349,100	1,121,500	448,000	6,094,500	6,773,400
100-999	11,900	9,000	1,400	-	1,500	-
1,000-4,999	67,200	60,800	6,400	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	54,000	40,100	13,900	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	113,900	27,600	86,300	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	218,300	67,300	151,000	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	144,300	144,300	-	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	1,703,500	-	862,500	448,000	393,000	-
1,000,000 or more	12,473,400	-	-	-	5,700,000	6,773,400
Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population)						
Total[b]	100.0	2.4	7.6	3.0	41.2	45.8
100-999	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	-
1,000-4,999	0.5	0.4	0.0	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	0.4	0.3	0.1	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	0.8	0.2	0.6	-	-	-
25,000-49,999	1.5	0.5	1.0	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	11.5	-	5.8	3.0	2.7	-
1,000,000 or more	84.4	-	-	-	38.5	45.8

a Not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews
b Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding
Israel includes Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 24 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1000 total population: the US, Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. Ten more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1000 total population: Ukraine, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Chile, Uruguay, Sweden, Austria, and Panama. Six

countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1000 total population: South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, and Spain.

Over the past decades, the basic size-and-density typology of Jewish communities throughout the world did not change as much as the underlying changes witnessed by individual countries. **Table 8** shows the configuration of Jewish populations in 2020 as compared to 1984, the first year for which such tabulation is available (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1986). The 1984 data are reported here unrevised and in the original format of the countries and territories that existed then.

Table 8 World core Jewish population distribution, by number of Jews in country, 1984 and 2020

Number of Jews in a country	N. of countries		Jewish population		% of world's Jews	
	1984	2020	1984	2020	1984	2020
Total[a]	**74**	**102**	**12,963,300**	**14,787,200**	**100.0**	**100.0**
100-999	23	42	11,000	11,900	0.1	0.1
1,000-4,999	17	28	41,900	67,200	0.3	0.5
5,000-9,999	7	7	43,800	54,000	0.3	0.4
10,000-49,999	16	14	362,400	332,200	2.8	2.2
50,000-99,999	2	2	136,500	144,300	1.1	1.0
100,000-999,999	6	7	1,616,000	1,703,500	12.4	11.5
1,000,000-4,999,999	2	0	5,046,700	0	38.8	0.0
5,000,000 or more	1	2	5,705,000	12,473,400	43.9	84.4

a Number of countries not including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews. Population and percent figures including countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 700
Sources: Schmelz and DellaPergola (1986); Table 7 above

The number of countries with at least 100 Jews indeed increased from 74 to 102, following the devolution of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the addition of several countries with very small Jewish communities that reached the 100-person threshold. The greatest increase was in the number of countries with less than 1,000 Jews, from 23 in 1984 to 43 in 2020. At the top of the distribution, two countries in 2020 had more than five million Jews, versus one only in 1984, when two countries had between one and five million Jews: Israel and the USSR. In the meantime, Israel grew and the USSR split into 15 states and lost most of its Jews through emigration.

Countries with between 100,000 and one million Jews comprised 12.5% of total Jewish population in 1984 versus 11.7% in 2020. Of the 15 republics of the FSU, only Russia had more than 100,000 in 2020 when it was joined by two new entries: Germany and Australia. Brazil and South Africa had more than 100,000 Jews in 1984, but fewer in 2020. France, Canada, the UK, and Argentina were included in the 100,000 and over category for both dates, but the gap between Canada and Argentina had more than trebled, from 65,000 in 1984 to 213,500 in 2020.

Communities between 10,000 and 100,000 comprised 3.9% of world Jewish population in 18 countries in 1984, versus 3.2% in 16 countries, respectively, in 2020. Among the smaller Jewish communities, those with less than 10,000 Jews comprised at both dates less than 1% of world Jewry, but in 1984 they were distributed across 47

countries and in 2020 across 77 countries. The apparent stability of the overall distribution reflected a strong concentration of Jewish population in a few countries at the top and a wide dispersion of very small numbers in many countries at the bottom. The transition from a concentration of Jews in one dominant and two secondary centers, to a configuration based on two main centers reflected the quite revolutionary changes undertaken by world Jewry in the transition from the 20th to the 21st century.

7.4 Jewish Population in Major Individual Countries

We turn now to a concise review of the information available and the criteria followed in updating the figures for the largest Jewish populations worldwide. The countries are listed in decreasing order of magnitude of the respective Jewish communities. Given the gradual and slow motion of demographic change, besides a few exceptions, we shall not repeat here the detailed descriptions of sources and patterns that appeared in previous volumes of the *American Jewish Year Book* and refer the reader to those previous volumes.

7.4.1 Israel

Since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Israel is the country with the largest core Jewish population worldwide. It is also the only one displaying a substantial rate of population growth—1.64% in 2019. With a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 3.09 children currently born per Jewish woman in 2019, and a relatively young age composition (27.1% under age 15 vs.13.7% age 65 and over), the Jewish population in Israel is the one worldwide displaying the highest fertility. Fertility is largely above generational replacement and continues to sustain a share of children about twice that of the elderly among the total Jewish population. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate is higher than the fertility for the total population in any other developed country and twice or more the current average of *Jewish* children among women in most Diaspora Jewish communities (sometimes called the *effective Jewish fertility rate*). This reflects not only the large family size of the more religious Jewish population component, but also a diffused and persistent desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially among the upwardly mobile (DellaPergola 2009c, 2009d, 2015b). A moderately positive international migration balance also helps keeping Israel's Jewish population increase. Information on religion is mandatory in official population data regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and in the permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Population and Migration Authority).

Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, arrivals to the country including immigrants, departures from the country including emigrants, and changes of religion). In the case of Jews and Judaism, the defining concept is a combination of religion and ethnicity according to rabbinic law (*Halakhah*). At the beginning of 2020, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 6,773,400, as against a revised total of 6,664,300 in 2019, excluding people who had been missing from the country for one year or more. A downward correction of -1,300 compared to the 2019 estimate reflects late entries and adjustments of demographic events, including conversions and other revisions of personal status. The revised core population combined

with the addition of 447,300 "Others"—non-Jewish members of households who immigrated under the Law of Return and their Israel-born children—formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 7,220,700 in 2020, of which these "Others" constituted 6.2% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). We assume about half of the members of Jewish households who are not recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate have one Jewish parent. The *Jewish parent* population of Israel is thus estimated at 6,997,100.

For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2019, 133,277 Jewish births and 38,581 Jewish deaths produced a net natural increase of 94,696 Jews. This represented 87% of Israel Jews' total growth in 2019. **Figure 7** demonstrates the changes in birth rates and death rates for Jews and Muslims in Israel between 1955 and 2019. The two birth rate lines in a sense mirror each other, with periodical increases and periodical decreases. A major adjustment toward lower natality occurred among Israel's Muslims since the end of the 1990s, accompanied by some increase among Jews. Besides different fertility levels, this largely reflected differences and changes in age compositions and age at marriage of the respective populations (Staetsky 2019). Death rates tended to be low and decreasing among both populations, but most of the time they were lower among Muslims due to their much younger age composition. For example, in 2019 the overall birthrate of Jews and Others was 19.3 per 1000 population (19.8 for Jews only), versus 23.0 per 1000 for all Arabs including Muslims, Christians, and Druze (24.4 for Muslims only). The death rate was 5.6 per 1000 Jews and others (5.8 for Jews only), versus 2.9 per 1000 for Arabs (2.7 for Muslims only). Such differences significantly affected the respective rates of natural increase: 13.7 per 1000 Jews and Others (14.0 for Jews only) versus 20.1 per 1000 Arabs (21.7 for Muslims only). The consequence—as demonstrated in **Figure 7** particularly for Jews and Muslims—was that in 2019 the Arab population continued to grow significantly faster than the Jewish population.



Figure 7 Births and deaths per 1000 population among Jews and Muslims in Israel, 1955-2019

Regarding the whole complex of components of population change, in 2019 18,800 Jewish new immigrants and immigrant citizens—Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time—arrived in Israel, out of a total of 37,700 immigrants. This means that 18,900 or slightly more than half were not recorded as Jewish. The net balance of Jewish migrants was 15,200 also comprising Jewish Israelis leaving the country and returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad. Therefore, an estimated 3,600 Jews (18,800 - 15,200) joined the pool of those who reside abroad permanently or in the long term. The total number of Israelis—Jews and non-Jews—permanently residing abroad was estimated at 563,000 to 601,000 at the end of 2018 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2020). Regarding the Others (not classified by religion), in 2020 there were 18,600 immigrants, and a net migration balance of 19,700, implying a further positive net balance of 1,100 between returning and leaving veteran Israeli residents. These data about Israel's international migration balance point to a steady if moderate level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to quite low levels of emigration in historical perspective. In 2019, the total number of new immigrants—*'olim hadashim*, Jewish and non-Jewish, not including immigrant citizens—increased to 33,096, versus 28,118 in 2018 and 26,333 in 2017. Reasons for the increase are mostly related to the relative advantage of the Israeli economy in recent years, namely low unemployment, over the stressed situation in many other countries. Explanations related to antisemitism or fear or terrorism produced much weaker results (DellaPergola 2020b, 2020d; DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020).

The number of converts to Judaism remained low and comprised only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants (Fisher 2013, 2015, 2019; Waxman 2013). In fact, the number of "Others" increased from 426,700 in 2019 to 447,300 in 2020 (+4.8% as against a total Jewish population increase of 1.6%). Israel's Central Rabbinate pursued a rather rigid conversions policy and did not adopt past attempts to develop a unified conversion program that would consensually fit all denominations (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988-1999; Nissim 2018). In 2019, the net balance of conversions to and from Judaism was negative: -800 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual). The balance of passages to and from lacking religious status was also minimally negative, -100. The beneficiaries were Islam (+700) and Christian denominations (+200). Some increase in religious intermarriage probably stands behind these figures. In Israel, the levels of ethnoreligious marriage were overall quite low (DellaPergola 2017d).

Turning now to the territorial aggregate of the State of Israel and of the Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza—WBG), **Table 9** reports the numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households *and* Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, as well as foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *Law of Return* definition) in each division is also shown. At the beginning of 2020, of a total 6,773,400 *core* Jews, 6,001,600 lived within Israel's pre-1967 borders; 215,800 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 23,200 on the Golan Heights; and 432,800 lived in the West Bank. The Jerusalem figure was revised in light or updated information (Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2020). Over the years, the pace of Jewish internal migration

from Israel's main portion to the West Bank was significantly correlated with levels of unemployment and emigration from Israel (DellaPergola 2019b).

In 2020, *core* Jews represented 74.3% of Israel's total *legal* population of, 9,140,500 inclusive of 1,918,600 Arabs and others, but excluding 209,500 foreign workers, undocumented tourists, and asylum seekers (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly). On 1.1.2020, the 209,500 had diminished by over 20,000 versus the previous year, and comprised 101,992 legal foreign workers, 17,484 undocumented foreign workers, 48,600 tourists whose visas had expired, 9,842 refuge seekers, and 31,547 illegal entrants (Israel Population and Migration Authority 2020). Israel's *Law of Return* Jewish population of 7,220,700 in 2020 represented 79.2% of the State's total legal population. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, comprised 20.8% of the total legal population. As shown in **Table 9**, the *Law of Return* Jewish population represented 78.9% of total residents within pre-1967 borders (including foreign workers and refugees), 38.6% in East Jerusalem, 48.4% in the Golan Heights, and 14.3% of the West Bank's total population. Since 2005, no Jewish population remains in Gaza.

Table 9 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2020[a]

Area	Core Jewish Population	Others	Core Jewish and others[b]	Arab population and others	Foreign workers and refugees[c]	Total	Percent of Jews and others[d]
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Grand total	**6,773,400**	**447,300**	**7,220,700**	**6,494,800**	**209,500**	**13,925,000**	**51.9**
State of Israel[e]	***6,773,400***	***447,300***	***7,220,700***	***1,918,600***	***209,500***	***9,348,800***	*77.2*
Thereof:							
Pre-1967 borders	6,101,600	428,500	6,530,100	1,537,800	209,500	**8,277,400**	**78.9**
East Jerusalem[f]	215,800	7,300	223,100	354,400	-	**577,500**	**38.6**
Golan Heights	23,200	1,600	24,800	26,400	-	**51,200**	**48.4**
West Bank	432,800	9,900	442,700	[g]	-	**442,700**	**14.3**[h]
Palestinian Territory (WBG)				***4,576,200***		***4,576,200***	-
West Bank	[i]	[i]	[i]	2,642,600	-	**2,642,600**	-
Gaza	0	0	0	1,933,600	-	**1,933,600**	-

a Revised rounded figures
b Enlarged Jewish population
c All foreign workers, undocumented residents and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders. Source: Israel Population and Migration Authority (2020)
d Column 3 divided by column 6
e As defined by Israel's legal system
f Estimated from Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research (2020)
g Included under Palestinian Territory
h Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction
i Included under State of Israel
Sources: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations Population Fund; and author's estimates

Regarding the Palestinian population in WBG, in November 2017 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) undertook a new Census which enumerated 4,705,600 persons, of which 1,875,300 lived in Gaza and 2,830,300 lived in the West Bank—including 281,200 in East Jerusalem. The Census results were about 250,000 lower than the estimated projection of 4,952,168 available from the PCBS' web site (PCBS 2018). The PCBS Jerusalem's population estimate clearly was an undercount because of their limited access to the city (PCBS 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2018). This would imply an annual growth rate of 1.84% since 2007 in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and 2.84% in Gaza—as against 2.40% for Muslims in Israel (including East Jerusalem) during the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual). These growth rates were much lower than in the past and pointed to significant differentiation within the Arab/Palestine population. The total rate of growth of Israeli Jews was 1.64% in 2019 with immigration, and 1.37% without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in WBG was decreasing as well due to net emigration. According to Israel's IDF Civilian Administration in Judea and Samaria (2018), the total of Palestinians recorded in the West Bank population register approached 3 million, but this figure did not discount sufficiently for Palestinian residents permanently living abroad. Keeping in mind the data in **Figure 8**, among the Arab population both birth rates and death rates probably continued to be somewhat higher in the Palestinian Territory than in Israel, and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. There was a minor internal migration flow from Gaza to the West Bank, estimated at 2,671 persons as of mid-2019 (Hass 2019), which continued in 2020. In the process, most Christian Palestinians had left Gaza because they felt persecuted. Our adjusted population estimates for WGB at the beginning of 2020 is 4,566,200, of whom 2,642,600 live in the West Bank and 1,933,600 live in Gaza. These figures (always excluding East Jerusalem) are lower than the Palestinian census because they discount for persons, students and others, who actually resided abroad for more than one year. Other much lower estimates of WBG population (e.g. Zimmerman et al. 2005a, 2005b, Feitelson 2013) rather than ascertained demographic criteria reflect a political stance (see also Miller 2015). The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 354,400 at the beginning of 2020, and constituted 37.8% of Jerusalem's total population of 936,400 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Choshen et al. 2010 and 2012, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies 2015, Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research 2016, 2020, DellaPergola 2008b).

By summing the 1,918,600 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 4,576,200 estimated Palestinians in WBG, a total of 6,494,800 Arabs/Palestinians obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, versus a total enlarged Jewish population of 7,220,700. **Table 10** reports the percentage of Jews in column 7 (which is column 3 divided by column 6) according to the *core* and *Law of Return* definitions, out of the total population of the combined territory of Israel and Palestine. Such percent is conditional upon two factors: the definition of who is a Jew, and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment. Relative to this territorial grand total, we demonstrate the potential effect on the existence and size of a Jewish population majority when gradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab/Palestinian population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is gradual growth of the potential Jewish share of total

population, along with hypothesized diminishing territorial and total population extents.

Table 10 Percent of core and Law of Return Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2020

	Percentage of Jews[a] by definition	
Area	Core	Law of Return
Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory	**48.6**	**51.9**
Minus foreign workers and refugees	49.4	52.6
Minus Gaza	57.5	61.3
Minus Golan Heights	57.6	61.4
Minus West Bank	74.3	79.2
Minus East Jerusalem	77.3	82.4

a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, Arabs and others of mentioned area are deducted and the percentages are recalculated accordingly
Source: Table 9

A total combined Jewish, Arab, and other population of 13,925,000 lived in Israel and the Palestinian Territory (WBG) at the beginning of 2019, including foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees. The c*ore* Jewish population of 6,773,400 represented 48.6% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel. Thus, by a rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, the extant Jewish majority not only is constantly decreasing but actually does not exist any longer among the broader aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between the Sea and the River (DellaPergola 2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2011a, Soffer and Bistrow 2004, Soffer 2015). If the 447,300 Others (non-Jewish members of Jewish households) are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *Law of Return* Jewish population of 7,220,700 represented 51.9% of the total population in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a narrow majority. If we subtract from the grand total, the 209,500 foreign workers, undocumented tourists and refugees, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations rise to, respectively, 49.4% and 52.6% of the total population legally resident in Israel plus the Palestinian Territory estimated at 13,715,500 in 2020. After subtracting the population of Gaza, the percentages of Jews out of total rise to 57.5% (core) and 61.3% (Law of Return); if subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the Jewish percentages become 57.6% and 61.4%, respectively; if subtracting the Palestinian population of the West Bank, they become 74.3% and 79.2%, respectively; and if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem the percentages rise to 77.3% and 82.4%. Interestingly, the proponents of much lower Palestinian population estimates argue that the percent Jewish (Law of Return) out of the total population of Israel and West Bank combined is 65% (Ettinger 2019), versus our estimated 61.4%. A spirited and aggressive polemic has been extant for several years about a modest 3.6% difference. The reality is that under current demographic trends, the rate of erosion of the Jewish majority is about 0.1% per year. The same data are graphically presented in **Figure 8**.



Figure 8 Percent Jewish out of total population of Israel and Palestine by different territorial and Jewish population definitions, 2020

7.4.2 The United States

In 2020 the Pew Research Center in Washington, DC, undertook a follow-up study to the landmark 2013 *Portrait of Jewish Americans*. At the time of this writing, the final results of the new survey were not yet available. Therefore the extant 5.7 million core Jewish population estimate will not be updated pending new evidence. The following overview deals with the main research issues and general context of US Jewish demography.

In the **US**, in the absence of official census documentation, Jewish population estimates must rely on alternative sources. These are now quite abundant, though of very unequal quality (Goldstein 1981, 1989, 1992; Sheskin 2015a). When assessing the current number of Jews in the US three issues should be considered:

(1) The need to rely on reasoning and empirical evidence grounded in *demographic concepts and research techniques* (discussed above and elsewhere in greater detail, see DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2011a, 2012, 2014a, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e);

(2) The *definitional predicament* already discussed above. To perform comparisons over time constant definition assumptions are needed. Given ongoing acculturation and assimilation trends in America, but also new meanings attributed to Jewish identity or the rediscovery of submerged identities from the past, group definitions today often may not be the same as past ones; and

(3) The broader *narratives* within which one seeks to place the findings and their interpretations (Kaufman 2014). Competing narratives and non-comparable empirical and definitional approaches often stand behind diverging US Jewish population estimates, with a high-low gap of over two million individuals. Opposite interpretations circulate of current and expected trends: rapid growth, stability, or slow decline. Intense debates in and outside the social scientific community relying on these divergent perceptions entailed very different implications at the cognitive level and for Jewish community service planning. Serious research (Heilman 2005, 2013; Pew Research Center 2013) was matched by a lively media discussion and intellectual polemic (e.g. *The Jewish Daily Forward* 2014, Kravel-Tovi 2020). Albeit hardly acknowledged in public let alone professional debate, the unescapable underlying condition is the end of a clear dichotomy between Jews and non-Jews in the US (DellaPergola 2015b).

The quest for US Jewish population estimates relies on three major strategies (DellaPergola 2013a). The **first** is to bridge across several different national Jewish population estimates available over the years by assessing intervening demographic changes: births and deaths, incoming and outgoing international migration, and identification changes such as accessions to and secessions from identifying as Jewish. In the US, several major data sources allow for a detailed reconstruction of nationwide Jewish population trends since the end of World War II to date. For all purposes, the logic of working nationally to obtain a *national* population estimate is the same logic that explains why, since 1790, a national population census (and not a compilation of local or State statistics) was held in the US (US Bureau of the Census).

The **second** strategy, pursued since the beginnings of US Jewish population studies in the early 1940s (*The American Jewish Year Book* 1899, Linfield 1942, Robison 1943), is to construct a national total from a compilation of existing local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume).

The **third** more recent strategy is to construct a national total through a combined analysis of a pool of national and local surveys periodically undertaken by public and private bodies, each of which include a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Of the three alternatives, only the first was designed to determine nationwide Jewish population estimates. The second and third methodologies were not, but they do provide valuable grounds for comparative analytic work and in-depth multivariate analysis (Hartman and Sheskin 2012, Hartman et al. 2017).

Serious attempts to monitor Jewish population size over time at the national level require a reliable baseline figure and updates based on solid empirical research. Each of the existing sources is imperfect, but they do amount to an impressive body of evidence: from historical assessment (Rosenwaike 1980), through the US Census of Religious Bodies (Schwartz et al. 2002), the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969), the 1971 National Jewish Population Study—NJPS 1971 (Massarik 1974, Lazerwitz 1978), the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey—NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991), NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003), the 2001 American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001), and the 1991 and 2008 American Religious Identity Surveys (ARIS) (Kosmin and Lachman

1993, Kosmin and Keysar 2009). These various data sets fit well one with another when performing forward-backward Jewish population projections as well as checking with available birth-cohort data on international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions to and from Judaism (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983 and 1988, DellaPergola et al. 1999, 2000, DellaPergola 2005, 2013a, Perlmann 2007). NJPS 2000-01 yielded an initial estimate of 5,200,000 after imputation of persons in homes for the elderly, prisons, military bases, and other institutional settings (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). Further cohort analysis and projections unveiled under-coverage of over 250,000 individuals born between 1950 and 1970 (Saxe et al. 2006a, 2007, Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). Evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality, accessions, and secessions provided revised estimates of 5,367,000 for 2000-01, and 5,425,000 for 2013—not including the institutionalized (DellaPergola 2013a). A rounded core Jewish population estimate could thus be placed at 5.6-5.7 million around 2010, and this indeed was the estimate suggested by a 2007 Pew survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008, Rebhun 2016). The 2015 Pew study of the US religious landscape confirmed the same orders of magnitude with a slightly higher percent of Jews among the total US adult population (1.9% versus 1.8%), well within the margins of sampling error (Pew Research Center 2015b).

The 2013 Pew *A Portrait of Jewish Americans* (Pew Research Center 2013) found 4.2 million adults and 900,000 children, for a total of 5.1 million Americans with *Jewish religion* (Jews by religion or JBRs) without other religious identities. Another 600,000 persons—500,000 adults and 100,000 children—reported *no religion and Jewish* (Jews of no religion or JNRs) without another identity, raising the total to a 5.7 million mutually exclusive Jewish population. This 5.7 million estimate more or less corresponded to a *core* Jewish population concept relying on self-assessment and mutual exclusiveness between religious or ethno-religious populations, and as noted, was fully consistent with the whole body of research on US Jewry since 1957.

As against this quite impressive body of evidence, higher Jewish population estimates were provided by research that instead of one national comprehensive source used compilations of many different smaller databases. Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin and Dashefsky evaluate the US Jewish population at 7,153,495 (see the US Jewish population reports at www.jewishdataban.org). This would be an increase of nearly 1,200,000 over a 1991 estimate of nearly 6 million obtained with the same method—at a time when the NJPS found 5.5 million. However, the possible determinants of such increase remain unexplained. The Pew 2013 survey provided estimates of *Jewish* immigrants from the FSU and from Israel definitely lower than those often circulated in public discourse Pew Research Center 2013). Jewish marriage propensities and fertility levels remained persistently low. While local Jewish community studies still are the most important tool for local Jewish community planning, the methodology of summing local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves conceded (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010, 2017; Sheskin 2008, 2009). One should acknowledge the diversity of databases and definitions, the lack of synchronization in time, and the very uneven quality of the technical procedures followed, including sometimes embarrassing skill gaps across different polling firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates, which as noted local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community summations may risk cumulating

significant errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006, Groeneman and Smith 2009).

The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) combined analysis of a large set of general social surveys is an innovative and ambitious project in the social scientific study of American Jews (Saxe et al. 2006b; Tighe et al. 2005, 2009a, 2009b). The Jewish population estimate suggested by SSRI for 2019, based on the synthesis of surveys conducted between 2012 and 2018 and additional inference, was 7.5 million plus or minus a margin of error of over 300,000 (SSRI 2019a, Saxe 2019, Tighe et al. 2019). This figure implies that since 1990 American Jewry increased by nearly 2 million or about 36%, quite higher than the 32% increase for the US total population. The latter includes Hispanics and African-Americans whose rate of growth is quite higher than among American whites of whom the overwhelming majority of US Jews are comprised—not to mention steady immigration to the US from Mexico and other countries (US Census Bureau 2019). This alleged Jewish population growth does not conform with the routinely practiced principles of demographic analysis. Indeed the SSRI project estimated that at least 70,000 Jewish babies were born annually in the US, and that a majority of US Jews did not adhere to any of the known Jewish religious denominations (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These figures can be plausible only if one adopts, rather than a *core* concept of individually-identified Jews, a broadly *enlarged* concept of total population with Jewish background (as already anticipated by Tobin and Groeneman 2003). Five important caveats should be stressed concerning the SSRI Jewish population estimates (SSRI 2019b):

(a) Jews are probably over-represented in general sample surveys because of their higher socioeconomic status and educational attainment, and their relatively lower presence among people difficult to cover like the homeless, those without a functioning telephone or Internet connection, prisoners in jails, or otherwise unable to answer a written questionnaire or a voice interview. By projecting the percent of Jews out of the total population which also includes those uncovered sections, an inflated Jewish estimate obtains;
(b) projecting a sample of US adults—like in the case of most general survey respondents—to obtain estimates for the total population ignores the comparatively lower percentage of children among Jews and thus inflates the Jewish estimate;
(c) in turn the SSRI allocation of children explicitly uses Pew estimates which include children defined as partly Jewish or of Jewish background, hence not part of the core Jewish population;
(d) projecting percentages of Jews among total population, hence population size, from the percentage of Jewish respondents out of all respondents ignores the multi-religious composition of many Jewish households and thus factors non-Jews into Jewish population estimates; and
(e) the criteria used to estimate the broader aggregate also including Jews of no religion, based on survey data on Jews by religion are problematic.

The latter point (using data on Jews by religion to estimate Jews of no religion) is important in view of attempts to estimate Jewish populations based on surveys which, as they do, include *Jewish* as one option in a question on religious identity (Magidin de Kramer et al. 2018, Hackett 2014). In the SSRI analysis, Jewish population is assessed at the county level through a logistic regression model that predicts the likelihood an adult identifies as Jewish when asked their religion. Factors involved in weighting the model include geographic distribution, sex, age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment. The model is fit using Bayesian Multilevel estimation with post-stratification (BMP) (SSRI 2019c). In other words, in many cases Jewishness of an individual is determined by a blind statistical iteration whose margin of error can be substantial, and not through a direct investigation of the personal religious or otherwise cultural identity of the interviewees. This contradicts a basic assumption in the social scientific study of Jewry that characteristics of Jews and possible differences versus non-Jews should be estimated empirically and not attributed a priori based on hypotheses. Furthermore, even if the "Jews by religion" estimates were accurate, the further attempt to extrapolate the "real" number of Jews from sources that only deal with religion—instead of directly ascertaining the complex nature of Jewish identification—are at best speculative.

In practice, the SSRI estimate of 4.4 million adults *Jewish by religion* in 2019 was quite similar to the 4.2 million found by the 2013 Pew survey (Pew Research Center 2013). The SSRI estimate then, while rejecting the reliability of national surveys like Pew's, built its own models of the proportion of persons of Jewish origin who declare not to have a religion borrowing the percentages from the same Pew survey (or from a contemporaneous local Jewish population study if available). The 2013 Pew survey—besides 5.1 million *Jews by religion* (4.2 million adults and 900,000 children)—indeed found 600,000 persons (500,000 adults and 100,000 children) with *no religion and Jewish*, and one million persons (600,000 adults and 400,000 children) with *no religion and partly Jewish* (DellaPergola 2015b). The total of 6.7 million designated in the Pew report as *the net Jewish population* estimate included that million. Excluding them, one reverts to the 5.7 core Jewish population. A further 2.4 million non-Jewish adults with 1.5 million children, for a total of 3.9 million, reported a *Jewish background*. Of these, about one-third had at least one Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013), thus raising the total population with at least one Jewish parent (PJP) to about 8 million (6.7 + 1.3). The about two-thirds (2.6 million) with a Jewish background who did not have a Jewish parent, further expanded the collective to 10.6 million. An additional 1.2 million non-Jewish adults reported some *Jewish affinity*, raising the figure to 11.8 million, not including the children of the latter group. Some of these broader definitions better conform, respectively, to our *Jewish parents*, *Jewish enlarged*, or *Law of Return* population definitions. **Table 11** reports a comparison between the Pew 2013 and SSRI 2019 data, distinguishing between adults and children, and between persons reporting or not Judaism as their religion. The differences between Pew and SSRI manifestly reveal the different definitions adopted. The SSRI estimates fit in-between the Pew Net Jewish population definition (including one million partly Jewish) and the Pew-based Jewish parent population including 1.3 million non-Jews.

Table 11 US Jewish population estimates by broad age groups and definitional criteria, Pew Research Center 2013, and SSRI 2019 - Millions

	Population definition	Pew 2013			SSRI-AJPP 2019			Difference
		Adults	Children	Total	Adults	Children	Total	Total
A	Jews by religion	4.2	0.9	5.1	4.4			+0.2
B	Jews no-religion	0.5	0.1	0.6				
C=A+B	**Core Jewish Population**	**4.7**	**1.0**	**5.7**	**(5.9)**	**(1.6)**	**(7.5)**	**(+1.8)**
D	No religion, partly Jewish	0.6	0.4	1.0				
E=B+D	**Total no-religion**	1.1	0.5	1.6	1.5			+0.4
F=A+E	**Total Net Jewish**	**5.3**	**1.4**	**6.7**	**5.9**	**1.6**	**7.5**	**+0.8**
G	Non-Jews, Jewish parent	0.9	0.4	1.3				
H=F+G	**Total Jewish Parent**	**6.2**	**1.8**	**8.0**	**5.9**	**1.6**	**7.5**	**-0.5**
I	Non-Jews J. background, no Jewish parent	1.5	1.1	2.6				
J=H+I	**Total Extended Jewish**	**7.7**	**2.9**	**10.6**	**(5.9)**	**(1.6)**	**(7.5)**	**(-3.1)**
K	Non-Jews, Jewish affinity	1.2	(0.2)	(1.4)				
L=J+K	**Total Law of Return (LRP)**	**8.9**	**3.1**	**(12.0)**				

Sources: Pew Research Center (2013), SSRI (2019)

The 2013 Pew study actually confirmed some well-known demographic patterns of US Jews, namely postponed marriage, non-marriage, and small family size (Barack Fishman and Cohen 2017; Hartman 2017). Intermarriage was assessed at 58% of the latest marriage cohorts based on an *extended* Jewish population definition and showing an increase over earlier cohorts. A crucial predictor of Jewish intermarriage frequencies is whether the marrying Jewish adult had two or one Jewish parents. The latter circumstance involved much higher levels of intermarriage and determined the overall frequency change over time (DellaPergola 2011a, Phillips 2018, Wright et al. 2020). Identification with Judaism among children of intermarriages, though on the increase (Sasson et al. 2017), tended to stabilize below the 50% of all such children and younger adults nationally, which would be the precondition to maintain demographic stability or even determine quantitative gains from intermarriage (Barack Fishman 2004; Dashefsky with Heller 2008; Rebhun 2013; Phillips 2013, 2018). Seven percent of the children raised in in-married households were raised as non-Jews (probably children from previous marriages) versus 67% among intermarried couples.

The current aging composition of US Jewry (also acknowledged by the SSRI study) and other evidence about age-specific birth and death rates based on standard demographic models, is plausibly correlated to fewer *Jewish* births annually (by the *core* definition) than Jewish deaths in the US. The Jewish death rate in the US is one of the least investigated topics in the field of Jewish demographic research and it would be a fair research priority to try to assess it empirically.

Jewish immigration to the US has nearly stopped from the FSU but continued at moderate levels from other countries in Western Europe, Latin America, and, to some extent, other countries in the Middle East and South Africa. The evidence for Israelis in the US shows a significant reduction in the influx, largely compensated by returns to Israel (Gold and Phillips 1996, Gold 2002, Cohen 2009, Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010, Rebhun 2014, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). The number of Israel residents who were allowed lawful permanent resident status in the US was 4,324 in 2015, 4,652 in 2016, 4,227 in 2017, 4,009 in 2018, and 4,702 in 2019—a five year average of 4,383 (US

Department of Homeland Security 2017, 2019). Accounting for other Jewish migration to the US, and discounting for the about 2,500 yearly emigrants to Israel, an annual net migration into the US can be estimated at 5,000 Jews (or slightly more). In other words, net immigration balances the losses due to the likely excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births (stressing the *core* definition), and the balance of accessions to minus secessions from Judaism. Shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society are comparatively more frequent than in other countries. Repeated surveys found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose membership, while Evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the "religiously undefined" (none and not reported) tended to gain (Kosmin and Lachman 1993, Kosmin et al. 2001, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008, Kosmin and Keysar 2009, Smith 2009, Pew Research Center 2015a). By the Pew 2013 survey, total secessions from Judaism were double the number of accessions; and by the 2015 Pew survey of the US religious landscape, the net balance of changes of religion resulted in a total lifetime loss of 600,000 persons for the Jewish side (Pew Research Center 2015b). Based on several comparable measures of Jewish identification, the *partly Jewish no-religion* individuals, mainly the children of intermarriages, looked in 2013 more similar to *non-Jews with Jewish background* than to Jews with no religion (*JNRs*), or to Jews by religion for that matter (DellaPergola 2015b).

Following these observations, relying on the 2013 Pew survey and its subsequent updates, stressing that the true predicament of American Jewish demography concerns population definitions, and following the assumption that Jewish identity is mutually exclusive versus other competing religious and ethnic identities, our *core* Jewish population estimate remained stable at 5,700,000 for 2019—the world's second largest. This might be an underestimate and hopefully undergoing research will help clarifying the matter. Broader definitional criteria naturally generate higher estimates. Including the partly Jewish with no religion and the pertinent portion of non-Jews with declared Jewish background, about eight million Americans have at least one Jewish parent. The *enlarged* total population including non-Jews in Jewish households approaches ten million. The *Law of Return* population probably approaches twelve million. By each of these expanded criteria, the number of persons included is significantly larger in the US than in Israel. See the US Jewish population report at www.jewishdatabank.org for more information.

7.4.3 France

France has the largest Jewish community in Europe and the third largest in the world. A 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohen with Ifergan 2003). Several follow-ups (Cohen 2005, 2007, 2013b) indicated a decreasing Jewish population, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the US, and other countries. A survey (Ifop 2015) addressed an enlarged definition of the Jewish population in France but did not provide conclusive information about the size of the Jewish community. Instead, it offered important insights about their past and prospective migration. In retrospect, 39% reported they had relatives living in Israel compared to 31% who had relatives in another country (especially the US, Canada, and the UK). This would correspond to a migrant ratio of 56% to Israel compared to 44% to other countries. Regarding possible future

migration, 13% reported they were seriously considering moving to Israel and another 30% had thought about it. The corresponding percentages for migrating to other countries were 13% and 33%, respectively. A previous survey of French Jewish adults age 18 to 40 about their expected country of residence in five years found that 33% expected to be living in France, 26% in Israel, 14% in another country, and 27% were not sure (Cohen 2013a). The 2018 European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) survey on perceptions of antisemitism in EU countries unveiled that 44% of French Jews had considered emigrating, versus 46% in 2012 (European Union Fundamental Rights Agency-FRA 2013, 2018). Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually for several years, actually increased to a historical peak of 6,627 in 2015, and lowered again to 2,431 in 2018 and 2,209 in 2020, for a total of over 50,000 between 2001 and 2019. Jewish emigration was also directed toward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of antisemitism, in part stemming from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in France and other parts of Europe. Assuming Israel attracted half to two-thirds of the total who departed France, between 75,000 and 100,000 Jews and family members emigrated from France since 2001. Some of these returned to France in the meantime, thus reducing the impact of net migration. Currently more than half of French Jews live in the Greater Paris metropolitan region (Cohen with Ifergan 2003; Ifop 2015; FRA 2018). Jews of Sephardi ancestry, mostly first, second, or third generation immigrants from North Africa, clearly predominate numerically over those of Central-Eastern European origin who, until World War II, constituted the main component of the Jewish population. Our 2020 core estimate for French Jewry decreased to 448,000.

7.4.4 Canada

In **Canada,** the quinquennial Census, and more recently National Household Survey (NHS) data on Jewish ethnicity (Statistics Canada 2019)—released in years ending with the digit 1 or 6—can be compared with data on religion—released every decade in years ending with the digit 1 (Statistics Canada 2003a, 2003b, Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2015, 2016, 2017, in this volume). Information on religion and ancestry was customarily collected through open-ended questions, where *Jewish* was one of the examples provided as a possible response. The 2016 NHS broke with this tradition and did not provide *Jewish* as an example. Probably as a consequence, the number reporting a Jewish ethnicity collapsed to 143,665 in 2016 from 309,650 in 2011. This makes the new data virtually unusable (see the Canada Jewish population report at www.jewishdatabank.org). Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, can include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are *not* included in the *core* concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion who declare a Jewish ethnicity (single or part of a multiple choice) are included in the *core*. The Jewish Federations of Canada-UIA defined this as the *Jewish Standard Definition* (Torczyner et al. 1993, Shahar 2004). The newly suggested *Revised Jewish Standard Definition* also accounts for: a) persons with no religious affiliation, but who are Israeli by ethnicity; b) persons with no religious affiliation, but with knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish as a “non-official” language; c) persons with no religious affiliation but who were born in Israel; and d) persons with no religious affiliation who lived

in Israel in 2006 (Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2014, 2015, 2016). This definition provided an estimate of 391,665 in 2011. The latter figure is not strictly comparable with the *core* Jewish population as it includes the fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, some of whom would better be included among the *Jewish parents* Jewish population. In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were Jewish by religion (Weinfeld et al. 2012). Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past decades provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. A total of 293,175 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of nearly 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 309,650 in 2011. Striking changes actually affected the distribution of Canadians and of Jews among them, by single and multiple ethnicities. The ongoing growth of a new *Canadian* ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities parallels the development of a new *American* ethnic identity in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). In 1981, 90% or 264,025 of total ethnic Jews declared Jewish as their single ethnicity, but this share decreased to 66% (245,580) in 1991, 53% (186,475) in 2001, 43% (134,045) in 2006, and 37% (115,640) in 2011. Such sharp decrease in Jewish ethnic identification can be explained by an increase in intermarriage which generates growing multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews (Goldman 2009), but also indicates that the relevance of Jewish ethnic (unlike religious) identity is rapidly diminishing, at least as a mutually exclusive category. A systematic evaluation of the Jewish ethnicity variable in the 2016 census (Smith and McLeish 2019) shows the full picture of passages from Jewish and non-Jewish ethnicity declarations, and vice versa, between the 2011 and 2016 censuses. Ethnic origins that replaced *Jewish* mostly included Eastern European countries while 4.7% stated *Israeli*. The dropping of Jewish ethnicity increased along with increasing generational seniority and acculturation in Canada. It was proportionally more frequent among those listing no religion or religion other than Jewish. On the other hand, among those *adding* Jewish as an ethnicity between 2011 and 2016, the plurality were Christians. While the decrease in responses for *Jewish* as an ethnic origin in 2016 was likely driven by the fact that *Jewish* was no longer among the list of ethnic origin examples, response mobility involving the Jewish ethnic origin is part of a larger pattern that predates the 2016 Census (Smith and McLeish 2019). These trends are confirmed by a large independent representative survey of Canadian Jews undertaken in 2018 (Brym, Neuman and Lenton 2019). From this study one learns that Canadian Jews displayed significantly higher levels of Jewish identification than Jews in the US (Pew Research Center 2013). Indicators of Jewish religious identification appeared much more resilient than indicators of Jewish ethnicity and community participation (Brym, Slavina, and Lenton 2019). Overall, between 2001 and 2011, 21,445 Jews by religion immigrated into Canada, mostly from the FSU, and were reported in Canada in the 2011 NHS. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion remained stable over the same ten years but it would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decrease of 6.5%) were it not for immigration. This, besides minor emigration, reflects a negative balance between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and passages of people from self-definition as Jews by religion to self-definition of Jews with no religion. Compounding the effects of continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition because of aging and cultural assimilation, we estimate the core Jewish population to have slightly increased to 393,000 in 2020—the world's fourth largest Jewish community. See the Canada Jewish population report at www.jewishdatabank.org

7.4.5 United Kingdom

In the **United Kingdom**, the national Census, including regional totals for Scotland and Northern Ireland, suggested a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 271,259 in 2011 (+1.69%) (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2002, 2012, United Kingdom National Records of Scotland NRS 2011, Miller et al. 1996, Kosmin and Waterman 2002, Graham et al. 2007, Graham and Waterman 2005, 2007, Voas 2007, Graham and Vulkan 2007, Graham 2013a, 2013b, Boyd and Staetsky 2013, Graham and Caputo 2015, Staetsky and Boyd 2015). The 2001 national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century and apparently somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry (Graham 2011). In 2011, the response rate significantly increased in those areas (Graham et al. 2012). Those who did not report a religion nationally rose from 23% in 2001 to 32% in 2011, but in view of the organized Jewish community's encouragement to participate in the Census, Jewish population was probably less affected by an increase in *no religion* and *not reported*. Mainstream British Jewry is aging, but the higher participation of Haredi Jews in the Census is reflected in a rejuvenating age composition, with an absolute increase of 3% in the percentage under age 15 and a 1% decrease in the percentage age 65 and over. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns. A reversal occurred in recent years from a long negative to a positive balance of Jewish births and deaths (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit 2005, Vulkan 2012, Casale Mashiah 2018). Intermarriage was on the rise, too, though at moderate levels compared with most other European and Western countries, from 11% of all couples in 1965-69 to 26% in 2010-13 (Graham 2016, 2018). The 2018 FRA survey found that intermarriage had significantly decreased among those under age 50 versus those over the same age (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020). At the same time, synagogue membership in the UK significantly decreased over time (Casale Mashiah and Boyd 2017). In 2016, 79,597 Jewish households across the UK held synagogue membership, against 92,653 in 1995. While total Jewish households declined from 147,349 in 2001 to 141,503 in 2016, the number of synagogues actually increased from 328 in 1983 to 454 in 2016. The denominational balance also significantly shifted. Between 2010 and 2016, synagogue membership declined by 7.5% for the Central Orthodox, 4.1% for the Reform, 9.1% for the Liberal, and 21.4% for the Sephardi; membership increased by 15.5% for the Masorti, and by 18.4% for the Strictly Orthodox. Jewish education was growing, confirming the growing impact of the Haredi sector on the Jewish birth rate (Graham, Staetsky and Boyd 2014, Staetsky and Boyd 2016). It is too early to assess any possible consequences of the 2020 Brexit for the UK economy and migration balance. Provisionally allowing for some incoming and outgoing migration, we assessed the UK's core Jewish population at 292,000 in 2020—the fifth largest Jewish community in the world.

7.4.6 Argentina

Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—following the bankruptcy of the country's Central Bank, dire economic conditions, and special incentives offered by Israel. Subsequently, the economic situation stabilized and emigration diminished approaching nevertheless a total of 13,500 between 2001 and 2019 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). By 2014, 4,400 persons lived in Jewish households in Miami in which at least one adult was Argentinian (Sheskin 2015b). A 2004 Jewish population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005) found an *enlarged* Jewish population of 244,000 as part of the over 300,000 who were identified as in some way of Jewish origin or living with a person of Jewish origin. Of the former, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered self as totally or partly Jewish. Other research suggested significant aging of the *core* Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005) and growing interreligious couples (Erdei 2014). Argentina's Jewish population was assessed at 179,500 in 2020—the world's sixth largest Jewish community.

7.4.7 Russia

In the **Russian Federation**, Jewish population continued its downward course in the context of a country whose general population had been diminishing for years and only recently started to slowly recover (Tolts 2008, 2014, 2015). After the compulsory item on ethnicity *(natsyonalnost)* on identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question became optional, the 2010 Russian Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another about 43,000 undeclared people who likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600 in 2010 (Tolts 2011). The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our *core* Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, extrapolated from a February 1994 Russian Federation Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Goskomstat 1994; Tolts 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). Comparing the totals and main geographical distributions in 2002 and 2010 (adjusted for under enumeration), the Jewish population diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration, aging, and a negative balance of births and deaths. Over 109,000 Jews (enlarged) migrated to Israel between 2001 and 2019. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and this basic configuration was not much altered through emigration or vital events. The striking negative balance of Jewish births and deaths, and the recent surge in Jewish emigration generated an extremely elderly age composition and continuing population decrease, only partially compensated by migration from other FSU republics and a moderate amount of returns of previous migrants to Israel (Tolts 2003, 2009, 2015; Cohen 2009). We evaluated Russia's Jewish population at 155,000 in 2020—the world's seventh largest Jewish community.

7.4.8 Germany

In **Germany**, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, brought to the country large numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish household members until 2005. This caused a significant boost in the Jewish population that had previously relied on scant numbers of Shoah survivors and several thousand immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. After 2005, immigration from the FSU diminished to a few hundred annually since the German government, under pressure because of a struggling welfare system, reduced the benefits to Jewish immigrants (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz et al. 2002; Erlanger 2006). In 2019, 272 new immigrants from the FSU were added to Jewish community membership, besides 255 from other countries (Zentralwohlfhartsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2020), versus a peak of 8,929 in 1999. The total number of *core* Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 at the beginning of 2007, diminished gradually to 94,771 in 2020.

Most of the growth was in the Länders (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (West Germany). Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographical absorption of immigrants, no specific area became dominant in Jewish population distribution, at least according to formal Jewish community membership. The main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rein-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Dortmund, Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin. The community-registered Jewish population in Berlin, despite wide reports of a huge increase, diminished from 10,009 at the beginning of 2007 to 9,037 in 2020. There is some evidence that Jews who are registered elsewhere might in reality be now living in Berlin (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012, 2015, 2019, Glöckner 2013, Rebhun et al. 2016). At the end of 2018, the number of officially recorded Israelis in Berlin was 5,319, as against 3,991 (plus 2,774 with dual citizenship) in 2014 and 3,065 in 2011. This does not account for Israelis and others who may have acquired German citizenship but who do not reside in Germany. Between 2000 and 2015, 33,321 Israelis were granted German citizenship, of which 31,722 kept it and 1,599 renounced it (Harpaz 2013; *Times of Israel* 2017). In 2018, 52% of the total Jewish adult population of Germany were foreign-born (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020). Among these, the Israeli-born constituted about 9% of the total Jewish population.

German Jews are very aged. In 2019, 245 Jewish births and 1,434 Jewish deaths were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of 1,189 Jews (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2020). Especially births may actually suffer from underreporting because of the lack of incentives to register. German Jewry enjoys new opportunities for religious, social, and cultural life, but also significantly depends on welfare and elderly services (Schoeps, et al. 1999, Ben Rafael et al. 2011, Glöckner and Fireberg 2015). Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and the choice by some Jews, including temporary migrants, not to affiliate, we estimated Germany's *core* Jewish population stable at 118,000 in 2020—the world's eighth largest Jewish community.

7.4.9 Australia

Australia's 2016 Census quite surprisingly recorded 91,022 Jews, a decline of 6.5% versus 2011. The explanation is easily found in changes introduced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the Census form. The option *No religion* was moved from the bottom to the top in the list of printed options. The result was a dramatic increase by 45.5% in the number of all Australians reporting no religion. Several other religions lost respondents: Anglicans 15.7%, Eastern Orthodox 10.7%, Catholics, 2.7%, and Other Christians 4.7%. Judaism did not appear as a printed option in the questionnaire but only as a write-in option. The suggestion of the *No religion* response option as the first on the list must have affected reporting of Judaism as well. The 2011 Census had reported a Jewish population of 97,336, compared to 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Graham and Narunski 2019). In view of the general non-response to the 2016 question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000 in 2011, a ten-year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2014a).

The Jewish population is highly concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney, which in 2016 together comprised about 85% of the total. Intermarriage in Australia was less frequent than in most other Western large and medium-size communities, but it was on the rise and affecting the effective Jewish birth rate (Graham 2018). The community's rather old age composition implies a fairly high death rate (Eckstein 2009; Markus et al. 2009; Markus et al. 2011; Forrest and Sheskin 2014). Yet, there possibly existed a small positive difference between an estimated 1,200 Jewish births and about 900 Jewish funerals around 2016 (Graham and Narunski 2019). Factors of Jewish population growth included continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, and moderate though rising intermarriage rates. Based on the new *GEN17 Australian Jewish Community Survey* (Graham and Markus 2018, Porat 2020), and a re-evaluation of the 2016 census (Graham and Narunski 2019) with an upward correction of previous *core* Jewish population estimates by 4,500, we estimated Australia's Jewish population at 118,000 in 2020—the world's ninth largest.

7.4.10 Brazil

In **Brazil**, the 2010 Census reported a national total of 107,329 Jews, of whom 105,432 lived in urban localities and 1,987 in rural localities (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica IBGE 2010). The census classified Brazil's population by color, and among Jews, 94,575 were white, 10,429 brown, 1,690 black, 492 yellow, and 143 indigenous. By region, 79,910 lived in the Southeast including the major cities, 12,963 in the South, 4,266 in the Northeast, 2,367 in the North, and 1,394 in the Central West (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica 1991 and 2000; Decol 1999, 2009). The 2010 census found 51,050 Jews in São Paulo state—36% more than in 2000. While an upward adjustment is reasonable, a 36% increase is not unless the previous census was badly incomplete. Systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the local Jewish Federation found 47,286 Jews (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002, Milkewitz et al. 2014).There also was a 2.5% increase in Rio de Janeiro (24,451 in 2010) and a

decrease of 8.7% in the rest of the Southeastern and Southern states (overall 17,372 in 2010). What cannot be attributed to demography and likely reflects new emerging Jewish identifications or misclassifications is a decennial increase of over 8,000 people (+125%) in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-Western states. These growing numbers in the least developed and more peripheral regions of Brazil, but to some extent also in São Paulo, point to inclusion as Jews in the Census population of many thousands of persons who in all probability belong to Evangelical sects and Jehovah's Witnesses, besides possible cases of *Converso* Jewish ancestry. The surge of interest in Judaism among local populations is an interesting feature embracing Brazil and several other countries in Latin America (Torres 2017). At the same time Jewish emigration to Israel increased significantly and amounted at about 5,800 in 2001-2019. Allowing for emigration and not including potential emerging communities, our assessment of Brazil's core Jewish population was 92,000 in 2020—the world's tenth largest Jewish community.

7.4.11 South Africa

A new survey undertaken in 2019 in **South Africa** brought about a significant downward reduction in local Jewish population estimates (Graham 2020). According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population of South Africa was 61,675, out of a reported total of 75,555 including nonwhites. Some of these nonwhites identified with Jewish ancestry, but probably were from messianic Christian denominations. Factoring in an evaluation of the national white non-response rate (14%) and additional factors led to a revised estimate of 72,000 (Saks 2003). South African Jewry was relatively stable after the major emigration wave just before the 1994 internal transferal of power from the apartheid regime to a democratic government, (Dubb 1994; Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006; Raijman 2016). However, due to the attrition of continuing emigration to Australia, Israel and other countries, and also because of diminishing birth rates versus relatively high numbers of burials and cremations, the Jewish population steadily declined. In 2015-16, on average, there were 751 Jewish deaths versus 484 Jewish births (Graham 2020). Jewish school enrollment remained quite stable, but this masked growing enrollment of non-Jewish pupils. Between 2001 and 2019 about 3,500 migrated to Israel. Our revised estimate of South Africa's Jewish population for 2019 was 67,500. The new survey evidence supported an estimate of 53,200 Jews for 2020, calling for a retrospective revision of previous annual estimates. Among the total Jewish population surveyed in 2019, 15% said they would leave South Africa. Of these, 51% said they would go to Israel (Graham 2020). Regarding the actual distribution of immediate family members who had left South Africa, 26.1% lived in Israel, 20.8% in the US, 20.5% in Australia, 19.7% in the UK, 5.6% in Canada, and 7.2% in another country.

7.4.12 Hungary

In **Hungary**, Jewish population trends reflect the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population has been diminishing for several years (Stark 1995 and 1997, Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002, Kovács 2013a, Population Reference Bureau 2020). A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger enlarged Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004).

In the 2011 Hungarian Census, only 10,965 reported themselves as Jewish by religion, compared to 13,000 in 2001, clearly an underestimate but indicative of a trend (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2003, 2013). A new survey in 2017, confirming the substantial gaps in Jewish population size according to different definitions, suggested a minimum-maximum range of 58,936-110,679 Jews for 2015 (Kovács and Barna 2018). Our core population estimate for 2020, at 47,200, was lower than the low of that range.

7.4.13 Ukraine

In **Ukraine,** the December 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews (Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). The 2010 census could not be implemented. Instability, internal cleavage, and war in Ukraine resulted in continuing Jewish emigration and population decline. Over 75,000 (enlarged) Jews migrated to Israel between 2001 and 2018. Between 1989 and 2001, the Jewish population—80% Russian speakers—diminished more sharply in the Western regions where the share of Russians was relatively lower. Patterns of decline of ethnic Russians were similar. The overwhelming concentration of Ukraine's Jews in regions with a predominantly Russian (and often pro-Russian) environment under military dangers had obviously negative consequences for the Jewish community. The 2001 census included 5,816 Jews in Crimea, subsequently annexed by Russia and where in 2014 a special census found 3,374 Jews (Rosstat 2014). Between 2001 and 2019, 81,815 (enlarged) migrated to Israel. Considering continuing emigration, we assess the 2020 *core* Jewish population at 45,000.

7.4.14 Mexico

In **Mexico**, the third largest Jewish community in Latin America, the 2010 Census reported a Jewish population of 59,161, plus another 8,315 *Neo Israelitas* (New Jews), for a total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these, 62,913—55,138 Jews and 7,775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica 2002). Projecting the number of Jews age 5 and over to an estimate inclusive of children age 0-4, the total Jewish population in 2000 would be about 49,000. An in-depth analysis of the 1970 Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) already had unveiled a significant presence, among those defined as Jews, of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment, exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and reportedly shoeless (*descalzos*). The further inclusion of a category of *Neo Israelitas* in 2010 leaves open the question of the attribution to Judaism of a population possibly comprising followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as descendants of *Conversos*. For the Federal Capital's metropolitan area, Jewish population surveys and other research found general stability of the Jewish population at numbers similar to the Census concerning a conventional definition (Comunidad Judía de México 2015, Bokser Liwerant 2013, Comité Central Israelita de México 2006, Comité Central Israelita de México 2000, DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). Some international migration operated both ways. Our 2020 Jewish population estimate was kept stable at 40,000.

7.4.15 Other Central and South American Countries

Uruguay experienced continuing Jewish emigration (Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006; Shorer Kaplan 2016). The Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was assessed at 16,500 in 2020. In **Chile**—on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003) and an earlier Jewish population survey (Berger et al. 1995)—the relatively stable core Jewish population was assessed at 18,300 in 2019. In the light of the 2012 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2013) the estimate was downwardly revised to 16,000 in 2020. The Census was feared to have undercounted the population (*The Economist* 2013), but over 1,000 Jews had migrated to Israel since 2001 and others had moved elsewhere thus justifying the correction. **Panama** over the past twenty years received several thousand Jewish immigrants, mostly from other Latin American countries. Its Jewish population in 2020 was estimated at 10,000. The Jewish community of **Venezuela** estimated at 6,000 in 2020, continued to shrink rapidly following political chaos, serious economic crisis, and lack of security in the country.

7.4.16 Other European Countries

Among European Union countries, a survey in the **Netherlands** in 2009 found high levels of intermarriage, a growing percentage of elderly, and an increase in the number of Israelis (van Solinge and de Vries 2001, Kooyman and Almagor 1996, van Solinge and van Praag 2010, Tanenbaum and Kooyman 2014). Out of an *enlarged* Jewish population of 52,000, 25% had a Jewish mother and 30% had a Jewish father. Accounting for aging and assuming incoming migration tended to balance emigration, our Jewish population estimate was 29,800 for 2020. In **Belgium**, quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that attracted Jews from other countries (Cohn 2003, Ben Rafael 2013). Some emigration reflected growing concerns about Islamization, terrorism, and antisemitism. The Jewish population was estimated at 29,000 in 2020. In **Italy**, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's Jewish population—decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 23,361 in 2018 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002, 2010, 2018, Lattes 2005, Campelli 2013, Campelli 2016). Our 2020 estimate of 27,300 considers some increase of conversions to Judaism and recent emigration.

In **Spain**, the Jewish population estimate of 11,700 in 2019 was revised to 13,000 in 2020. Madrid had 1,200 affiliated households and Barcelona had about 900 (DellaPergola and Staetsky 2020). This reflected some continuing immigration from Latin America but also continuing emigration. The Spanish government 2015 initiative to offer Spanish citizenship to Jews able to demonstrate ancestry from the medieval expulsion, after a slow beginning gathered momentum reaching 132,226 requests (Jones 2019). Most requests came from Latin American countries, 5,400 came from the US, and 4,900 from Israel. The actual number of naturalizations was expected to be much lower given the quite stringent criteria requested, such as knowledge of Spanish, of the Spanish Constitution, and Iberian culture. The large majority of these requests from Latin American countries involved persons who were not themselves part of the core Jewish

population or Law of Return definition but belonged to more distant Jewish identification or ancestry circles. A similar law was approved in 2015 in **Portugal** to atone for the expulsions from that part of the Iberian Peninsula (BBC 2015). Brexit fueled an increase in the number of applications for Portuguese citizenship. The Jewish population had been estimated at 600 in 2019 and was upwardly revised to 3,100 in the light of the 2011 census (Statistics Portugal 2012).

In **Sweden**, the Jewish population was estimated at 15,000 in 2020, based on a local survey and on a total estimate of the affiliated community of about 5,600 (Dencik 2003, 2013). In **Austria**, a thorough analysis of updated Jewish community records and state vital statistics (Statistik Austria 2019, Staetsky and DellaPergola 2019b) suggested an upward revision to a 10,300 estimate in 2020. In **Poland** the 2011 Census found about 2,000 persons who indicated Jewish as their only ethnicity and an additional about 5,000 persons who indicated Jewish as their second ethnicity after a mostly Polish first one (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2012). Jewish community membership was reported at 1,222. Pending further data analysis now underway, an estimate of 4,500 for 2020 was adopted assuming one half of those reporting multiple ethnicities would fall within the *core* Jewish population definition.

Among countries not part of the EU, in **Switzerland**, according to census data and current updates, the Jewish population age 15 and over was 16,275 at the end of 2018. In light of Census and emigration data (Statistik Schweiz 2005, 2012, 2019), the estimate was updated to 18,500 in 2020. In **Turkey**, a 2002 survey in Istanbul indicated widespread aging in a community that since has experienced growing emigration and population decline (Filiba 2003, Tuval 2004, Kubovich 2016). Most of the Jews live in Istanbul's European neighborhoods. Between 2001 and 2019 migration to Israel was over 2,200. Our 2020 estimate was 14,600 Jews.

In **Belarus,** the 2009 population census indicated a Jewish population of 12,926, including 6,692 males and 6,234 females (Belstat 2009). The 2019 population census indicated a population diminution of 600,000 over the past 20 years (Belsat 2020). The census provided a total of 13,705 Jews, including 10,269 males and 3,436 females. Such sex imbalance is not feasible, so we shall ignore this source pending further clarifications. In view of the emigration to Israel of 11,793 between 2001 and 2019, and continuing aging, our 2020 estimate is 8,500.

7.4.17 Other continents

In **New Zealand**, likewise Australia, the 2018 census form did not list Judaism (nor other religions) as explicit options as in past censuses and left respondents the choice to write-in their preferred denominations. As a consequence, the percent of those not reporting a religion increased by 38% versus the previous census of 2013. The Jewish population apparently decreased by 23%, to 5,274. Of these, 3,348 reported Judaism (nothing further specified), 327 Conservative Judaism, 792 Orthodox Judaism, and 807 Reform Judaism (Statistics New Zealand 2018). In consideration of the evident under-reporting of religion in the 2018 census we kept our estimate of Jews in New Zealand at 7,500 for 2020. In **Asia**, the 2020 estimate for **Iran** was upwardly revised to 9,500 in light of the 2016 census (Statistical Centre of Iran 2016). The total Jewish population in Southeast Asian countries was estimated at 5,500 in 2020 and was growing especially in **China**.

Jews in Arab countries had practically disappeared, but the United Arab Emirates was entered for the first time in this global review with an estimated 300 permanently resident Jews. In Africa, a trickle of emigration continued from **Morocco** and **Tunisia**, estimated together at 3,100 in 2020, while emigration from **Ethiopia** was at a minimum.

7.5 Major Cities and Metropolitan Areas

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for Jews to live in major metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas, too, Jews often manifested unique propensities to settle or resettle in specific neighborhoods that were more compatible with their socioeconomic status, and/or more attractive to them because of the vicinity of employment or Jewish community facilities (DellaPergola and Sheskin 2015). Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions of urban areas vary by country. The urban areas reported in **Table 12** for the US are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), whereas in previous years we reported data for larger Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSAs). Therefore some of this year's estimates (with the remarkable exception of Philadelphia) may look lower than in previous years. Similar changes in the definition of Metropolitan areas affected some of the data for Israel.

It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jewish populations in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. Regarding the US Metropolitan areas (MSAs) we use here the data reported in the US Jewish population report at www.jewishdatabank.org. Sheskin and Dashefsky rely mostly on the estimates resulting from definitions used by the local Jewish federations. This often results in what we define as an extended aggregate of persons currently Jewish, born or raised Jewish—or in other words a population with Jewish parents (PJP)—although in most instances not one that includes non-Jewish members of Jewish households. Their estimates, along with those for other locales not reported here, suggest a total US Jewish population of 7,153,495, as against our core Jewish population of 5.7 million. To create a more comparable database, we adopted here an extended (PJP) definition for metropolitan areas out of the US as well. For metropolitan areas in Israel, the data refer to an enlarged Jewish population (EJP) including non-Jewish household members as well. Making reference to a broader Jewish population definition raises the percent of Jews out of the total local population, but at the same time lowers the proportion in the selected metropolitan areas out the total world Jewish population. This has to be kept in mind when comparing the 2020 estimates with those for previous years.

Moreover, unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on major urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. Especially in the US, the differences may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. The respective estimates of part-year residents were mostly included in the estimates in **Table 12**. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur

internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and some may even commute weekly (Pupko 2013). The case of Israelis regularly commuting abroad for work has also become more frequent.

Table 12 Metropolitan areas with populations with Jewish parents (PJP) above 100,000, 1/1/2020[a]

Rank	Metropolitan area	Country	Jewish population (PJP)[b]	% Jews out of total population	% of world Jewish population (PJP)[b]	
					%	Cumulative %
1	Tel Aviv[c]	Israel	3,845,300	94.9	21.3	21.3
2	New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA	U.S.	2,109,300	11.0	11.7	33.0
3	Jerusalem[d]	Israel	973,300	72.3	5.4	38.4
4	Haifa[e]	Israel	630,000	73.2	3.5	41.9
5	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA	U.S.	622,480	4.7	3.5	45.4
6	Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL[f]	U.S.	535,500	8.3	3.0	48.3
7	Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD	U.S.	419,850	6.9	2.3	50.7
8	Paris[g]	France	337,600	2.8	1.9	52.5
9	Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	U.S.	297,290	4.7	1.6	54.2
10	Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI	U.S.	294,280	3.1	1.6	55.8
11	Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH	U.S.	257,460	3.6	1.4	57.2
12	Be'er Sheva[h]	Israel	245,000	61.1	1.4	58.6
13	San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA	U.S.	244,000	5.2	1.4	60.0
14	London[i]	U.K.	230,400	2.4	1.3	61.2
15	Buenos Aires[j]	Argentina	230,300	1.4	1.3	62.5
16	Toronto[k]	Canada	219,900	4.5	1.2	63.7
17	Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta, GA	U.S.	119,800	2.0	0.7	64.4
18	Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD	U.S.	117,800	4.2	0.7	65.1
19	San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA	U.S.	100,000	3.0	0.6	65.6

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city Definitions vary by country. The US metropolitan areas are Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined by the US Office of Management and Budget.
See www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/demo/metro-micro/delineationfiles.html
A table of the population of the top 20 MSAs appears in the US Jewish population report at www.jewishdatabank.org.
Israel metropolitan areas are defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics
b Several of the US estimates refer to Population with Jewish parents (PJP). All Israel Jewish Populations are Enlarged Jewish Populations (EJP). Data for other countries refer to Population with Jewish Parents (PJP)
c Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, Ashdod Subdistrict, and sections of Judea and Samaria area. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon
Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000
d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of the Judea and Samaria District. Includes Bet Shemesh with over 100,000 Jewish population.
e Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District
f Includes about 55,000 part-year residents
g Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
h Includes Beersheba Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District
i Greater London and contiguous postcode areas
j Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A
k Census Metropolitan Area

Beyond any doubts, at any rate, stands the overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally. In 2020, more than half (53.4%) of world Jewry (extended to include their non-Jewish household members) lived in only seven metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Sheskin and Dashefsky in this volume). These seven areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York-Newark-Jersey City, Jerusalem, Haifa, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, and Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington (**Table 12**). Nearly two-thirds (65.6%) of an admittedly rough estimate of family enlarged world Jewry lived in the seven previously mentioned largest areas plus another 12 with at least 100,000 members of Jewish households: Paris, Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, Boston-Cambridge-Newton, Be'er Sheva, San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, London, Buenos Aires, Toronto, Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta, Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, and Sand Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad.

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and surpassing 3.8 million Jews by the *enlarged* definition, largely exceeded that in the New York MSA, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.1 million Jews. Of the 19 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, eleven were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, and Argentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being national or regional capitals, enjoying higher standards of living, with highly developed infrastructures for higher education and hi-tech, and widespread transnational connections. The Tel Aviv area also featured the highest percent of (enlarged) Jews among the total population (94.9%), followed at a distance by Jerusalem (72.3%), Haifa (73.2%), and Beersheba (61.1%), the balance mostly being Israeli Arabs. In the rest of the world, the highest percent of Jews in a metropolitan area was in New York (11.0%), followed by Miami-Fort Lauderdale (8.3%), Philadelphia (6.9%), San Francisco (5.2%), Washington and Los Angeles (4.7% each), Toronto (4.5%), and Baltimore (4.2%).

7.6 Major Determinants of Demographic Change

The changes in the size and composition of Jewish populations outlined above reflect a chain of interrelated factors each of which in turn depends on a complex array of explanatory determinants. We briefly review here three of these factors—international migration, identificational changes, and age composition—which help understanding the mechanisms behind the demographic polarization that has emerged between Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora.

7.6.1 International Migration

Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migration of Jews is quite imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants as such by single country of origin (Israel Central

Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of the respective migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit et al. 2010). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2017; Eurostat 2015). Jewish organizations, like HIAS—formerly the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS 2013) in the US or the Zentralwohlfhartsstelle (annual) in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on a yearly basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.

Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the FSU opened its doors to emigration at the end of 1989. Of the estimated over 1.7 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2019 including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel's share of the total increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years of 1990-1991. It then decreased to 41% in 2002-2004 and increased again in subsequent years—significantly so in 2019. The US lost weight as a destination for FSU migrants since the onset of the 21st century, as was the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany since 2005. These remarkable increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU—as a whole and throughout its different regional realities—during times of rapid geopolitical change and shifts in economic opportunities, as well as real or expected disruptions in the societal environment affecting Jewish life. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic options in the main countries of destination (DellaPergola 2020b).

Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948 and 1968, and about 60% between 1969 and 2015 (Amit and DellaPergola 2016). Clearly migration, or rather a migration balance producing a net surplus to Israel, reduces the population of the Diaspora and increases the Jewish population of Israel. **Table 13** shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2018 and 2019. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core* Jewish population, definition (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual, and unpublished data).

In 2019, Jewish international migration increased versus the previous year. In recent years, the volume of Jewish migration was far from the peaks of the past, due to the increasing concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the rapidly decreasing Jewish population in the less developed countries from which most of Jewish emigration derived. We already noted the clearly negative relationship that prevails between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to stay or to emigrate. At the same time perceptions and experiences of mounting antisemitism or a violent environment in some countries, particularly in France, Ukraine, Turkey, and Venezuela, stimulated Jewish emigration in more recent years. In the foreseeable future, a continuation of moderate levels of migration can be expected, provided that current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions are not seriously disrupted across the global system, especially in Europe.

In 2019, 30,096 new immigrants arrived in Israel (an 18% increase over the previous year and the highest since 2002) from 87 countries and territories, compared to 28,118

in 2018, 26,333 in 2017, and 25,010 in 2016. In 2019, immigration to Israel increased from the European and the Asian republics of the FSU, Latin America, Africa, and Oceania, while it diminished from the European Union and other non-FSU countries, North America, and non-FSU countries in Asia. Migration toward other countries did not necessarily follow the same patterns of change over the years. Indeed, Israeli immigration law (the Law of Return) allows for comparatively easier access and immediate citizenship to Jewish migrants and their families, especially after a new Citizenship law of 2017, but the integration difficulties experienced in Israel by some immigrants may have created a deterrent. One case in point is immigration from France which, after an all-time peak in 2015 (6,627), declined to 4,147 in 2016, 3,160 in 2017, 2,431 in 2018, and 2,209 in 2019. The Russian Federation was the main country of origin in 2019 (15,753 immigrants vs. 10,474 in 2018 and 7,109 in 2017), followed by Ukraine (6,177 vs. 6,428 in 2018 and 7,027 in 2017), and the US (2,471 vs. 2,514 in 2018 and 2,568 in 2017). No other country had more than 1,000 migrants to Israel. Among countries with more than 100 immigrants, minuscule increases occurred from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, South Africa, and Australia. Declines were recorded from Canada, Venezuela, Belgium, Germany, the UK, Moldova, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and India. Only 41 immigrants arrived from Ethiopia in 2019 compared to 31 in 2018 and 43 in 2017. To these figures, one should add several thousand immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than many Western countries. This made Israel a reasonably attractive option for international migration until the end of 2019.

The top graph in **Figure 9** demonstrates the annual changes in the number of immigrants to Israel from six of the major countries of origin: Russia, Ukraine, the US, France, the aggregate of Latin American countries (Amlat), and Ethiopia. Clearly the fluctuations reflected local circumstances in each country and not one common underlying determinant, possibly related to the receiving country Israel. Occasional peaks were related in Ukraine to civil war and the armed conflict with Russia; in Latin America the collapse of the Central Bank in Argentina in 2002; in France mounting terrorism and antisemitism; and in Ethiopia the variable policies adopted by Israel's government toward bringing more or less of the candidates for immigration who still reside in transition camps in Addis Ababa and elsewhere. But the dominant underlying factor was the variable amount of economic stress in the different countries of origin as exemplified by annual rates of unemployment, as against unemployment levels in Israel which greatly diminished over the 2010s (DellaPergola 2020b).

The bottom graph in **Figure 9** demonstrates the frequency of migration to Israel per 1000 Jewish population in each country of origin in each year (using a logarithmic scale). The highest frequencies initially appeared in Ethiopia, reflecting a systematic repatriation policy which was discontinued after 2013. The significantly high frequencies in Russia and the Ukraine reflect the security conditions of border areas, but also quite deeper socioeconomic discomfort. Increases in France due to security uncertainty seem to have been counteracted by difficulties experienced with immigrants' absorption in Israel. In Latin America the situation partially normalized after the above-mentioned economic bankruptcy. The US continued to feature the lowest propensity for emigration of any country. Emigration frequencies are clearly ordered according to the level of development of countries. However, France, though being more developed than Latin America, most

of the time, displays higher migration frequencies. While it cannot be disputed that the preference for Israel as a country of destination over competing countries is significantly affected by Jewish norms and values, *aliyah* seems nevertheless to follow the logic of global development and the response to economic stress and opportunity.

Table 13 New immigrants to Israel[a], by last country of residence, 2018-2019

Country	2018	2019	Country	2018	2019	Country	2018	2019
GRAND TOTAL[b]	**28,118**	**33,096**	Hungary	36	42	Tadjikistan	6	3
America Total[b]	**4,146**	**4,202**	Ireland	1	3	Turkmenistan	16	36
North America	**2,759**	**2,688**	Italy	74	70	Uzbekistan	200	209
Canada	245	217	Luxembourg	4	3	**Other Asia**	**227**	**139**
United States	2,514	2,471	Malta	7	4	China	19	10
Central America	**144**	**188**	Netherlands	62	46	Hong Kong	1	10
Cayman Is.	0	5	Poland	24	24	India	111	28
Costa Rica	10	13	Portugal	7	5	Indonesia	1	1
Cuba	2	10	Romania	22	3	Iraq	1	0
Dominican Rep.	0	1	Slovakia	6	0	Iran	76	67
El Salvador	5	1	Spain	63	84	Japan	2	1
Guadeloupe	1	0	Sweden	20	25	Nepal	0	2
Guatemala	8	3	United Kingdom	514	497	Pakistan	0	1
Honduras	5	7	**FSU in Europe**	**18,123**	**23,141**	Philippines	2	2
Mexico	93	133	Belarus	943	919	Singapore	3	3
Panama	20	15	Estonia	7	7	Thailand	7	10
South America	**1,243**	**1,326**	Latvia	48	80	Vietnam	4	0
Argentina	283	410	Lithuania	42	43	Yemen	0	4
Bolivia	5	6	Moldova	173	156	**Africa Total[b]**	**363**	**463**
Brazil	586	588	Russian Federation	10,474	15,753	**Northern Africa**	**99**	**117**
Chile	34	43	Ukraine	6,428	6,177	Egypt	0	1
Colombia	84	44	FSU unspecified	8	6	Ethiopia	31	41
Ecuador	13	7	**Other Europe**	**290**	**242**	Morocco	52	47
Paraguay	8	11	Albania	0	3	Sudan	0	6
Peru	47	33	Bosnia Herzegovina	0	1	Tunisia	16	22
Uruguay	54	84	Gibraltar	2	0	**Sub Saharan**	**264**	**346**
Venezuela	129	100	Monaco	5	5	Congo	2	0
Europe Total[b]	**22,041**	**26,750**	North Macedonia	0	1	Ghana	1	0
European Union[c]	**3,628**	**3,367**	Norway	3	2	Guinea Bissau	0	1
Austria	26	23	Serbia	12	3	Ivory Coast	0	1
Belgium	108	95	Switzerland	79	67	Kenya	0	1
Bulgaria	6	7	Turkey	189	157	Mozambique	1	0
Croatia	1	1	Yugoslavia	0	3	Namibia	3	0
Cyprus	5	27	**Asia Total[b]**	**991**	**1,144**	Rwanda	0	1
Czech Republic	18	14	**FSU in Asia**	**764**	**1,005**	South Africa	256	342
Denmark	9	6	Armenia	9	15	Zimbabwe	1	0
Finland	8	11	Azerbaijan	131	191	**Oceania Total**	**121**	**129**
France	2,431	2,209	Georgia	176	316	Australia	117	129
Germany	170	161	Kazakhstan	203	199	New Zealand	4	0
Greece	6	7	Kyrgyzstan	23	36			

a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including temporary residents, returning Israelis, and immigrant citizens
b Including country unknown
c Not including the Baltic countries
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data



Figure 9 Number of immigrants to Israel from major countries of origin, and rate of immigrants per 1000 Jews 2001-2019

On the other hand, Israel—in part because of its small market and the limits this imposes upon some employment opportunities—is today probably the main single supplier of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and to other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010; Rebhun et al. 2016, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2020). Levels of emigration from Israel are overall low, consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of human development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings confirm the primacy of socioeconomic determinants related to both the basic level of development of a country and its current economic situation, along with variations in the stringency of regulations about

immigrant admissions. The effects of ideological, security, and fear-related factors such as antisemitism end up as weaker determinants of the volume and timing of Jewish immigration and emigration—namely to and from Israel (DellaPergola 2020b).

7.6.2 Intermarriage and Identificational Change

Intermarriage is not the cause but certainly may be one important correlate of the transformation of a person's Jewish identification, from clearly defined and mutually exclusive as against other alternatives, into a weaker and sometimes uncertain or even forgotten residue (DellaPergola 2009b, Phillips 2018). Besides personal Jewish identities, intermarriage is the main determinant of a household's religious composition and a prime factor in affecting the identities of the descendants and the overall ethnoreligious composition of the enlarged population of Jews and their family mates. **Figure 10** provides a detailed overview of the respective weight of different population groups defined by progressively more extensive Jewish identification criteria, beginning with the core definition and within the limits of the broader Law of Return definition. The data cover each of the 20 largest Jewish populations worldwide. Countries where the core Jewish population constitutes a larger share relative to the Law of Return definition include South Africa, Australia, the UK, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Mexico, and Chile. Countries where the core Jewish population constitutes a low share of the Law of Return definition include Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Germany, the US, and the Netherlands.

7.6.3 Age Composition

The age composition of a population is a fundamental mediator between demographic processes that precede a certain point in time and the processes that unfold after that point. Age structures are sensitive to the composition of migrants which usually include some over-representation of younger adults and their children. Exceptions occur when the immigrants include a large share of elderly persons as has been the case for migration from the FSU to Germany, or even to the US and Israel over the past decades. In general, populations in the sending countries tend to become older as a consequence of migration. Populations in the receiving countries may become younger or older depending on their extant age composition and the composition of the migrants. Austria is one example where migration has resulted in a younger population, Israel is an example of the opposite.

The birth rate, however, is the main determinant of the age composition of a population. Large cohorts reflecting years of high birth rates, as was the case in the US during the baby-boom years (1946-1964), produce a younger population. A persistent high birth rate, as in Israel, produces an expanding population in which each cohort is followed by a slightly larger one, so creating a graphical image of a pyramid. Low birth rates, as typical of most Jewish populations out of Israel, generate smaller cohorts which sometimes are smaller than those born several years before and in the extreme case may produce a graphic image of an upside down pyramid. In recent years some upward reversal in the Jewish birth rate occurred in the UK, Austria, and possibly Australia. In **Figure 11,** we have compiled the age structures for several contemporary Jewish populations, reflecting different stages of demographic transformation. Most of the data refer to the *core* definition.



Figure 10 World and 20 largest Diaspora Core, Jewish Parentage, Enlarged, and Law of Return Jewish populations, percentage distributions, 2020 (Source: Appendix table)

Israel, here portrayed in 2000 and 2019 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics annual) is the only case where each age group is larger than the one immediately older. The largest age group was 0-14. Israel actually is the only country in the world with a high child dependency ratio (greater than 45%) along with a relatively high old-age dependency ratio (greater than or equal to 15%). It is included by the UN in the double dependency category (United Nations Population Division 2017). At the opposite extreme, Germany in 2019 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2020) had an extremely elderly age distribution, with the largest group at 65 and over. Similarly, Russia in 2002 and 2010 and other Jewish populations in Eastern Europe had very low shares of children (down to 5%) and large shares of elders (up to 40%). The US in 2013 (Pew Research Center 2013), the UK in 2011 (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2012), and several other English-speaking countries represent intermediate cases but with some important differences. Both the US and UK Jewish populations underwent significant aging and had relatively low birth rates during the past 50 years. In the US, the effects of the baby boom were visible, with the by far largest age group being those age 45-64 in 2013, born 1949-1968. There were significantly fewer children age 0-14 than young adults age 15-29. In the UK, while aging was significant as well, the effects of the post-World War II baby boom were significantly less and there were again more children than young adults in 2011. Some rejuvenation in the age composition was visible, reflecting the growing impact of Haredi Jews among the UK total Jewish population. A similar effect was visible in Austria and in other countries, including Israel.

As a benchmark for future demographic change, these very different age structures portend quite different scenarios. Assuming no major future migration waves in the foreseeable future, countries with

large cohorts of elders will unavoidably experience some numerical decline. Populations that are currently younger will have more of a chance of having children and possibly increasing or maintaining their size, as well as holding a growing share of world Jewish population.



Figure 11 Age structures of selected Jewish populations, 2011-2019, percentages
* Population with Jewish Parents (PJP).

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Since inception, the *American Jewish Year Book* has documented the Jewish world and has given significant attention to Jewish population issues. Since 1981, responsibility for preparing annual population estimates for world Jewry was taken by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Division was founded by Roberto Bachi in 1959, was headed by Uziel O. Schmelz until 1986, by the present author until 2010, and by Uzi Rebhun since 2010. Jewish population estimates appeared in the American Jewish Year Book, then under the aegis of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), until 2008. Since 2010, our world Jewish population estimates appeared in the framework of the North American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish DataBank), and since 2012 within the renewed *American Jewish Year Book.* World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009 and as of January 1, 2011 were prepared for publication but not issued. The interested reader may consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained (especially Schmelz 1981 and DellaPergola 2015a).

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Appendix

Mechanisms of population change

Jewish population change is determined by a known set of demographic factors which can increase or decrease the number of Jews in the world or in any given country over time. Formally, in the fundamental demographic equation, **P(t)** signifies the population size at any point in time, called **t**, and **P(t-1)** is the population size at a preceding point in time; **B** and **D** stand for the number of births and deaths, respectively; **I** and **E** stand for immigration into and emigration from the given population; **A** and **S** stand for the numbers of accessions and secessions, i.e. conversions or other modes of identificational change, into and out of the Jewish community, respectively.

$$P(t) = P(t-1) + (B-D) + (I-E) + (A-S)$$

Unfortunately, the demographic data currently available on Jews in most countries of the world are not sufficient to translate this equation into accurate numbers. However there exist abundant and significant indications about the size and characteristics of the major demographic factors involved, and the respective directions of change.

Definitions

In most Diaspora countries, the ***core Jewish population*** (***CJP***—a concept initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews, *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps, but does not necessarily coincide, with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria (Jewish only, no religion). Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another identity, and those of

Jewish origin who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted. The *core* population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources.

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings, which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

A major research issue of growing impact is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the 2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey-NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in the *core* Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. A further category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).

The 2013 Pew Research Center's A Portrait of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), by introducing the previously not empirically tested concept of *partly Jewish,* helped clarify the demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and the comparison of results more ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerns the status of the *partly Jewish* as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as some analysts would have it. Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in some total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers would suggest that the *partly Jewish* stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories of *Non-Jews with Jewish background*, or *Non-Jews feeling some Jewish affinity*. Recent research experience indicates that people may shift their identities over time across the different layers of the *core* Jewish definition, and between different *core* and *non-core* statuses. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary identifying as Jewish and as something else and vice versa in response to the particular context or moment when the question about identity is being tested. At any particular moment, then, there will be a countable Jewish population, which is not necessarily the same as the previous or the following moment.

Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of ***total population with at least one Jewish parent*** (***PJP***) includes the core Jewish population plus anyone currently not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey, the total population with Jewish parents besides the core comprised two sub-groups: (a) persons who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish, and (b) persons who report not being Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013).

The ***enlarged Jewish population*** (***EJP***—a concept initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) further expands by including the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are *partly Jewish*; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish parent;

and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most Jews who are identified in the Pew survey as *partly Jewish* or as *PJBs* who are not part of the US *core* Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of *multiple ethnicities,* naturally should be included under the *enlarged* definition. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households.

The ***Law of Return population*** ***(LRP)*** reflects Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants. The Law of Return awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return* (Gavison 2009), a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform) who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews with Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law itself does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities—but only for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the *Law of Return*. Articles 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to *all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren,* as well as to *their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses*. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so-called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998 and 2018). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand their reach strategies to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions than to the *core* definition.

Presentation and quality of data

Jewish population estimates in this report refer to January 1, 2020. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence some margin of inaccuracy. Corrections also were applied retroactively to the 2019 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2020 estimates. Corrections of the 2020 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident core Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in the **Appendix Table** an estimate of:

1) mid-year 2019 Total Population (including both Jews and non-Jews) (Population Reference Bureau 2020);
2) the estimated January 1, 2020 core Jewish population (CJP);
3) the number of Jews per 1000 total population; and
4) an indicator of the type of source used to derive the Jewish population
5) a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate.
6) Rough estimates of the population with Jewish parents (PJP)
7) Rough estimates of the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of all non-Jewish members in a Jewish household (EJP)
8) Rough estimate of the Law of Return population (LRP).
9) The Core Jewish Population rank.

The rough estimates were derived from available information and assessments on the recent extent and generational depth of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective core Jewish populations, and the data should be taken as indicative only.

Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be better to indicate a range for the number of Jews (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective core Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counting. Wherever possible, we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents. (This is similar to the part-year resident, or “snowbird” issue in estimating the US Jewish population in Sheskin and Dashefsky, in this volume.)

Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. We report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of the sources used in this study. In the **Appendix Table** the main types of sources are indicated as follows:

(C) National population census. This in theory would be the best source, but undercounts and over counts do occur in several countries which need to be evaluated.

(P) National population register. Some countries, besides the periodical census, also keep a permanent population register which is constantly updated through detailed accountancy of individual demographic events.

(S) Survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities, undertaken most often by a Jewish community organization, and sometimes by a public organization.

(J) Jewish community register kept by a central Jewish community organization.

(E) Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organization.

Our estimates reflect these sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily correspond exactly with those indicated in the given sources. When necessary, additional information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates. The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each country's Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the **Appendix Table**, as follows:

(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country during the intervening period.

(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening period.

(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trend;

(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

The year in which a country's base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtained is also stated as part of the accuracy rating. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2020 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola et al. 2000b; and author's current updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments that occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used findings from these projections to refine the 2020 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

Appendix Table. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2020

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b] CJP	Jews per 1000 total popula-tion	Source			Population with Jewish parent[c] PJP	Enlarged Jewish population[f] EJP	Law of Return population[g] LRP	Core Jew. pop. rank
				Type[c]	Accuracy rating[d]					
WORLD	**7,691,430,000**	**14,787,200**	**1.92**				**18,030,900**	**21,005,700**	**23,809,100**	
AMERICA TOTAL	**1,011,228,000**	**6,466,900**	**6.40**				**8,954,500**	**11,155,500**	**13,416,700**	
Bermuda	65,000	100	1.54	C	C 2016		200	300	400	83
Canada	37,413,000	393,000	10.50	C	B 2019		450,000	550,000	700,000	4
United States	329,153,000	5,700,000	17.32	S	B 2013		8,000,000	10,000,000	12,000,000	2
Total North America[h]	**366,691,000**	**6,093,100**	**16.62**				**8,450,200**	**10,550,300**	**12,700,400**	
Bahamas	389,000	200	0.51	C	B 2010	X	500	700	900	77
Barbados	287,000	100	0.35	C	B 2010	X	200	300	400	83
Costa Rica	5,060,000	2,500	0.49	J	C 2000		2,800	3,100	3,400	43
Cuba	11,212,000	500	0.04	S	C 2013		1,000	1,500	2,000	67
Dominican Republic	10,400,000	100	0.01	E	D 2000		200	300	400	83
El Salvador	6,454,000	100	0.02	E	C 2000		200	300	400	83
Guatemala	17,581,000	900	0.05	S	B 1999		1,200	1,500	1,800	61
Jamaica	2,811,000	500	0.18	C,J	C 2010	X	300	400	500	67
Mexico	126,577,000	40,000	0.32	C,S	B 2010		45,000	50,000	65,000	14
Netherlands Antilles[i]	321,000	400	1.25	C	C 2016		500	700	900	71
Panama	4,219,000	10,000	2.37	S	C 2012		11,000	12,000	13,000	25
Puerto Rico	3,059,000	1,500	0.49	J	C 2000		2,000	2,500	3,000	53
Virgin Islands	105,000	400	3.81	E	D 2016		600	700	800	71
Other	30,910,000	200	0.01		D 2020		400	600	800	
Total Central America, Caribbean	**219,385,000**	**57,400**	**0.26**				**65,900**	**74,600**	**93,300**	
Argentina	44,939,000	179,500	3.99	S	B 2003		260,000	310,000	360,000	6
Bolivia	11,470,000	500	0.04	J	C 1999		700	900	1,100	67
Brazil	209,332,000	92,000	0.44	C	B 2010		120,000	150,000	180,000	10
Chile	19,107,000	16,000	0.84	C,S	B 2012	X	20,000	24,000	28,000	20
Colombia	50,374,000	2,100	0.04	S	C 2010		2,800	3,500	4,500	46
Ecuador	17,268,000	600	0.03	J	B 2011		800	1,000	1,200	66
Paraguay	7,156,000	1,100	0.15	C	B 2002		1,300	1,600	1,900	58
Peru	31,781,000	1,900	0.06	S	C 2000		2,400	3,000	3,500	49
Suriname	602,000	200	0.33	J	D 2000		400	600	800	77
Uruguay	3,519,000	16,500	4.69	S	B 2013		20,000	24,000	28,000	19
Venezuela	28,516,000	6,000	0.21	S	C 2012		10,000	12,000	14,000	32
Total South America[h]	**425,152,000**	**316,400**	**0.74**				**438,400**	**530,600**	**623,000**	
EUROPE TOTAL	**829,462,000**	**1,329,400**	**1.60**				**1,819,300**	**2,325,300**	**2,820,800**	
Austria	8,877,000	10,300	1.16	C,S,J	B 2019	X	14,000	17,000	20,000	24
Belgium	11,458,000	29,000	2.53	S,J	C 2018		35,000	40,000	45,000	16
Bulgaria	6,975,000	2,000	0.29	C,J	C 2011		4,000	6,000	8,000	48
Croatia	4,055,000	1,700	0.42	C,J	C 2001		2,400	3,100	3,800	52
Cyprus	1,250,000	300	0.24	C,E	C 2012	X	400	500	600	74
Czechia	10,670,000	3,900	0.37	C,J	C 2011		5,000	6,500	8,000	37
Denmark	5,819,000	6,400	1.10	S,J	C 2018		7,500	8,500	9,500	31
Estonia	1,328,000	1,900	1.43	C,P	A 2017		2,700	3,500	4,500	51

Finland	5,521,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010		1,600	1,900	2,200	56
France	64,834,000	448,000	6.91	S	B 2018		550,000	650,000	750,000	3
Germany	83,100,000	118,000	1.42	S,J	B 2018		150,000	225,000	275,000	8
Greece	10,701,000	4,100	0.38	J	B 2000		5,200	6,000	7,000	36
Hungary	9,770,000	47,200	4.83	C,S	C 2018		75,000	100,000	130,000	12
Ireland	4,939,000	2,700	0.55	C	B 2016		3,600	5,000	6,500	41
Italy	60,345,000	27,300	0.45	S,J	B 2018		34,000	41,000	48,000	17
Latvia	1,913,000	4,500	2.35	C,P	A 2017		8,000	12,000	16,000	34
Lithuania	2,787,000	2,400	0.86	C,P	B 2011		4,700	7,500	10,500	45
Luxembourg	620,000	700	1.13	J	B 2000		900	1,100	1,300	64
Malta	500,000	100	0.20	E	D 2012		200	300	400	83
Netherlands	17,335,000	29,800	1.72	S	B 2018		43,000	53,000	63,000	15
Poland	38,400,000	4,500	0.12	C,S,J	C 2018		7,000	10,000	13,000	34
Portugal	10,269,000	3,100	0.30	C	B 2011	X	3,500	4,000	5,000	38
Romania	19,361,000	8,900	0.46	C,J	B 2002		13,000	17,000	20,000	27
Slovakia	5,454,000	2,600	0.48	C	C 2011		3,600	4,600	6,000	42
Slovenia	2,088,000	100	0.05	C	C 2003		200	300	400	83
Spain	47,073,000	13,000	0.28	S,J	C 2020	X	16,000	19,000	22,000	23
Sweden	10,286,000	15,000	1.46	S	C 2018		20,000	25,000	30,000	21
Total European Union 27	**445,728,000**	**788,800**	**1.77**				**1,010,500**	**1,267,800**	**1,505,700**	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,493,000	500	0.14	C	C 2001		800	1,100	1,400	67
Channel Islands	170,000	200	1.18	S	C 2015	X	250	300	400	77
Gibraltar	35,000	800	22.86	C	B 2019	X	900	1,000	1,100	63
Monaco	38,000	700	18.42	S	B 2012	X	900	1,100	1,300	64
North Macedonia	2,078,000	100	0.05	C	C 1996		200	300	400	83
Norway	5,345,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010		1,600	2,000	2,500	56
Serbia	6,945,000	1,400	0.20	C	C 2001		2,100	2,800	3,500	55
Switzerland	8,572,000	18,500	2.16	C	B 2012		22,000	25,000	28,000	18
Turkeyk	82,607,000	14,600	0.18	S,J	B 2016		19,000	21,000	23,000	22
United Kingdom[j]	66,833,000	292,000	4.37	C,S	B 2018		330,000	370,000	410,000	5
Other	5,840,000	100	0.02		D 2020		250	400	500	
Total other Europe[h]	**181,956,000**	**330,200**	**1.81**				**378,000**	**425,000**	**472,100**	
Belarus	9,467,000	8,500	0.90	C	B 2009		17,000	25,000	33,000	28
Moldova	3,543,000	1,900	0.54	C	B 2014		3,800	7,500	10,000	49
Russia[k]	146,731,000	155,000	1.06	C	C 2010	X	320,000	460,000	600,000	7
Ukraine	42,037,000	45,000	1.07	C	C 2001		90,000	140,000	200,000	13
Total FSU Republics	**201,778,000**	**210,400**	**1.04**				**430,800**	**632,500**	**843,000**	
[Total FSU in Europe][l]	**207,806,000**	**219,200**	**1.05**				**446,200**	**655,500**	**874,000**	
ASIA TOTAL	**4,503,074,000**	**6,808,500**	**1.51**				**7,046,700**	**7,286,200**	**7,303,600**	
Israel[m]	8,696,600	6,340,600	729.09	C,P	A 2020	X	6,559,300	6,778,000	6,778,000	
West Bank[n]	3,085,300	432,800	140.28	C,P	A 2020	X	437,800	442,700	442,700	
Gazan	1,933,600	0	0.00	C,P	A 2020	X	0	0	0	
Total Israel and Palestine[o]	**13,715,500**	**6,773,400**	**493.85**				**6,997,100**	**7,220,700**	**7,220,700**	
[Total State of Israel][p]	**9,139,300**	**6,773,400**	**741.13**				**6,997,100**	**7,220,700**	**7,220,700**	**1**
Armenia	2,962,000	100	0.03	C	B 2011		300	500	700	83
Azerbaijan	10,023,000	7,200	0.72	C	B 2009		10,500	15,500	20,500	30
Georgia	3,997,000	1,500	0.38	C	B 2014		3,000	5,000	7,500	53
Kazakhstan	18,509,000	2,500	0.14	C	B 2009		4,800	6,500	9,500	43

Kyrgyzstan	6,457,000	400	0.06	C	B 2009		700	1,000	1,500	71
Turkmenistan	5,942,000	200	0.03	C	D 1995		400	600	800	77
Uzbekistan	33,471,000	2,900	0.09	C	D 1989		6,000	8,000	10,000	40
Total former USSR in Asia	**90,582,000**	**14,800**	**0.16**				**25,700**	**37,100**	**50,500**	
China[q]	1,406,222,000	3,000	0.00	E	D 2015		3,200	3,400	3,600	39
India	1,391,885,000	4,800	0.00	C	C 2011		6,000	7,500	9,000	33
Indonesia	268,419,000	100	0.00	E	D 2016		200	300	400	83
Iran	83,911,000	9,500	0.11	C	B 2016	X	10,500	12,000	13,000	26
Japan	126,180,000	1,000	0.01	E	D 2015		1,200	1,400	1,600	59
Philippines	108,117,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400	83
Singapore	5,804,000	900	0.16	J	C 2015		1,000	1,200	1,400	61
South Korea	51,846,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015		200	300	400	83
Syria and Lebanon	23,926,000	100	0.00	E	D 2015		200	300	400	83
Taiwan	23,593,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400	83
Thailand	66,374,000	200	0.00	E	D 2015		300	400	500	77
United Arab Emirates	9,586,000	300	0.03	E	D 2020	X	500	700	900	74
Other	832,913,500	100	0.00		D 2020		200	300	400	
Total other Asia	**4,398,776,500**	**20,300**	**0.00**				**23,900**	**28,400**	**32,400**	
AFRICA TOTAL	**1,305,215,000**	**56,800**	**0.04**				**71,700**	**83,900**	**97,100**	
Egypt	99,064,000	100	0.00	J	C 2015		200	300	400	83
Ethiopia	112,079,000	100	0.00	S	C 2015		500	1,000	2,500	83
Morocco	35,587,000	2,100	0.06	J	C 2015		2,500	2,800	3,100	46
Tunisia	11,665,000	1,000	0.09	J	C 2015		1,200	1,400	1,600	59
Total Northern Africa[h]	351,973,000	3,300	0.01				4,400	5,500	7,600	
Botswana	2,283,000	100	0.04	E	C 2000		200	300	400	83
Congo D.R.	86,791,000	100	0.00	E	C 2000		200	300	400	83
Kenya	52,574,000	300	0.01	J	C 2000		500	700	900	74
Madagascar	26,969,000	100	0.00	J	D 2016		200	300	400	83
Namibia	2,495,000	100	0.04	C	C 2000		200	300	400	83
Nigeria	200,964,000	100	0.00	E	D 2000		200	300	400	83
South Africa	58,616,000	52,300	0.89	C,S	B 2019	X	65,000	75,000	85,000	11
Zimbabwe	14,645,000	200	0.01	C	B 2001		400	600	800	77
Other	507,905,000	200	0.00		D 2020		400	600	800	
Total Sub-Saharan Africa[r]	**953,242,000**	**53,500**	**0.06**				**67,300**	**78,400**	**89,500**	
OCEANIA TOTAL	**42,451,000**	**125,600**	**2.96**				**138,700**	**154,800**	**170,900**	
Australia	25,305,000	118,000	4.66	C	A 2016		130,000	145,000	160,000	9
New Zealand	4,973,000	7,500	1.51	C	B 2013		8,500	9,500	10,500	29
Other	12,173,000	100	0.01		D 2020		200	300	400	

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